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ABSTRACT 
Do individual states have the power to prohibit the sale and use of a 
drug that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
approved? Two years ago, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
tried to do so, but a federal court issued a preliminary injunction 
against this action. Although criticized at the time as unprecedented, 
the Massachusetts ban hardly represented the first time that a state 
had taken such an initiative, but it did provide the occasion for 
considering whether the U.S. Constitution would stand in the way. 
This Article carefully evaluates objections based on implied 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause, the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As it turns out, the question does not admit of a 
categorical answer, but at least in some circumstances a state would 
violate the Constitution if it tried to nullify a federal license granted 
to the manufacturer of a pharmaceutical product. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fifteen years ago, I asked: “Could a state entirely prohibit the 
sale of a drug approved by the FDA?”1 The question arose in the 
immediate aftermath of the controversial decision of the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) to authorize the introduction of 
mifepristone (Mifeprex®) and the prospect that some states might try 
to ban the use of this abortifacient.2 The tentative answer that I 
sketched at the time turned in part on peculiar aspects of that drug 
and its licensing process,3 and, as it turned out, the problem remained 
entirely hypothetical. Subsequently, in my Medical Technology 
casebook, I posed the question somewhat more broadly: “[W]hat 
about other therapeutic agents that do not raise the constitutional 
questions in connection with procreative choices? If a state entirely 
prohibited sales within its borders of an FDA-approved product, . . . 
would the Constitution forbid such an exercise of a state’s police 
power?”4 Then, in 2014, one state tried to ban a drug that lacked any 
of the special baggage associated with mifepristone, thereby 
presenting the constitutional questions in a fairly straightforward 
fashion,5 and a federal district court found enough merit in some of 
these objections to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the state’s 
prohibition.6 
Part I discusses the recent effort by officials in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to prohibit the sale of a narcotic 
analgesic product less than six months after the FDA approved this 
prescription drug. A court granted the manufacturer a preliminary 
injunction, though it did so on the basis of a seriously flawed 
preemption analysis. Part I then compares and contrasts what 
happened in Massachusetts with occasional attempts in other states 
to nullify licensing decisions by the FDA. Part II examines the 
                                                     
 1. Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone 
Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571, 600 (2001). 
 2. See id. at 599 & n.132. I also had considered whether the FDA (under 
new leadership) could have reversed course, see id. at 591-94, and whether Congress 
could have overridden the agency’s licensing decision, see id. at 594-99. 
 3. See id. at 601-03. For more about mifepristone, see infra notes 66-71 
and accompanying text. 
 4. LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 144 
(Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2012). 
 5. See infra Section I.A. 
 6. See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at 
*2 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014); see also infra notes 23-44 and accompanying text 
(discussing and critiquing this decision). 
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primary constitutional objections to such initiatives, including a more 
nuanced consideration of the implied preemption arguments as well 
as dormant Commerce Clause and substantive due process objections 
not considered by the court in Massachusetts. By assessing these 
possible obstacles in tandem, one can better identify under exactly 
what circumstances states must abide by the judgments of federal 
regulatory officials when licensing pharmaceutical products. 
I. STATE EFFORTS TO PROHIBIT WHAT THE FDA HAS ALLOWED 
Although hardly unprecedented, the recent decision in 
Massachusetts to ban the sale of a drug shortly after FDA approval 
represented a stark affront to the licensing judgments of federal 
officials. The resulting litigation, however, left more questions than 
answers about the constitutionality of such efforts. Before tackling 
those loose ends in Part II, it helps to situate this latest case among 
earlier state initiatives to prohibit the sale or use of pharmaceutical 
products approved by the FDA. 
A. Massachusetts Takes on Zohydro® (and Loses) 
In 2013, the FDA approved a new drug application (NDA) 
submitted by Zogenix, Inc. for an extended-release hydrocodone 
product intended for patients with chronic severe pain that failed to 
respond to alternative treatment.7 A couple of years earlier, critics 
had questioned the wisdom of developing this opioid analgesic,8 and 
an advisory committee convened by the FDA had voted against 
recommending approval.9 Nonetheless, the agency decided to allow 
                                                     
 7. See Matthew Perrone, FDA Unexpectedly OK’s New Hydrocodone 
Option, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2013, at B5. 
 8. See Chris Hawley, Hopped-up Painkiller Has Experts Worried: Pure 
Version of Hydrocodone, Now Being Tested, Raises Addiction Fears, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 27, 2011, at A1; Gary Robbins, San Diego Drugmaker Plays 
Down Concerns on Painkiller; It Says Zohydro Would Not Be Abused, as Addiction 
Experts Fear, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 4, 2012, at C1. 
 9. See Perrone, supra note 7, at B5 (“The approval came as a surprise 
since the agency’s own panel of outside advisers gave the drug an overwhelmingly 
negative review last year. The panel of pain specialists voted 11 to 2 . . . against 
approving the drug, questioning the need for a new form of one of most widely 
abused prescription drugs in the United States.”); Roni Caryn Rabin, New Painkiller 
Rekindles Addiction Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2014, at D1 (“Members of the 
F.D.A. committee who voted against approval acknowledged they were influenced 
by the drug overdoses claiming more and more lives each year. But they were also 
disturbed by red flags raised during the clinical trials of Zohydro.”); see also John 
4 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
the California-based company to introduce its product (marketed as 
Zohydro ER®), which drew howls of protest from public health 
experts and law enforcement officials.10 After all, for two decades the 
FDA had struggled to manage widespread abuse and diversion of a 
similar extended-release oxycodone product (OxyContin®).11 The 
agency’s approval of Zohydro struck some observers as doubly 
perplexing insofar as it had just one day earlier recommended 
rescheduling combination products that included hydrocodone from 
Schedule III to the more restrictive Schedule II in response to 
escalating patterns of abuse.12 Hydrocodone when used as the sole 
                                                                                                                
Fauber, Potent New Painkiller Open to Abuse: FDA’s Approval of Easily Crushed 
Opioid Ignores Its Own Staff, Advisers, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 2013, at 
A1 (“A November 2012 memo from the FDA’s own staff warns that the drug will 
be abused more than traditional hydrocodone products.”). 
 10. See Bradley J. Fikes, Painful Dilemma; San Diego Company’s Zohydro 
ER Caught in Debate over Needs of Legitimate Patients Versus Potential for Drug 
Abuse, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 23, 2014, at C1 (describing “a firestorm of 
criticism”); Sabrina Tavernise, Pressured on Opioids, F.D.A. Takes Steps to 
Toughen Stance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2016, at A12 (“The F.D.A. has come under fire 
for continuing to approve opioids. . . . Its approval in 2013 of a drug called Zohydro 
brought public outcry over what critics saw as yet another opioid in a market 
flooded with them.”); Opioid Painkillers: Fact and Myth, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 
2014, at E3 (“[A]ttorneys general from 28 states have asked the FDA to reconsider 
its decision because the drug offers no clear advantages over others already on the 
market and its potency makes it a target for misuse and abuse. And more than a 
dozen Republican and Democratic members of Congress have signed a bill that 
would ban Zohydro ER.”); cf. Anne E. Schweighardt & Katherine M. Juba, 
Extended-Release Hydrocodone: The Devil in Disguise or Just Misunderstood?, 48 
ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 1362, 1363-64 (2014) (suggesting that fears of misuse 
have been overblown). Indeed, a whiff of scandal surrounded the process. See John 
Fauber & Kristina Fiore, Senators Probe FDA–Drug Firm Meetings: Letter Alleges 
“Pay-to-Play” on Zohydro Approval, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 2014, at 
A7. 
 11. See Lars Noah, Product Hopping 2.0: Getting the FDA to Yank Your 
Original License Beats Stacking Patents, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 161, 171-
78 (2015). 
 12. See Barry Meier & Eric Lipton, F.D.A. Shift on Painkillers Was Years 
in the Making, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2013, at A1 (“[P]ublic health advocates who 
had cheered the agency’s [long delayed rescheduling] decision the day before were 
dismayed when the F.D.A. approved” Zohydro.); Editorial, FDA Undermines 
Campaign Against Deadly Painkillers, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 2014, at 8A; see also 
Drug Enforcement Admin. (DEA), Schedules of Controlled Substances: 
Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination Products from Schedule III to Schedule 
II, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,661, 49,682 (Aug. 22, 2014) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1308.13(e)(1) (2015)). 
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active ingredient had always faced Schedule II controls,13 which may 
help to explain why no company had ever before commercialized 
such a product. 
Traditionally, hydrocodone drug products included the 
nonnarcotic analgesic acetaminophen (brand name Tylenol®), but 
that active ingredient came under increased scrutiny after reports of 
liver damage from prolonged use coupled with cases of excessive 
dosing because acetaminophen appears in numerous prescription 
(Rx) and over-the-counter (OTC) products.14 A pure hydrocodone 
product avoided those risks,15 though it would increase concerns 
about abuse and diversion, and Zohydro magnified such worries 
because it represented an extended-release version packing a higher 
dose of hydrocodone in each tablet.16 When taken as directed, the 
active ingredient would diffuse more slowly in the patient’s body, 
providing longer and more even pain relief than traditional 
hydrocodone products with acetaminophen (e.g., Vicodin® and 
Lortab®); if, however, an abuser managed to circumvent the slow-
release mechanism by, for instance, crushing the tablet, then the full 
dose would become available for immediate absorption. Moreover, 
and in contrast to the currently marketed versions of OxyContin, 
Zohydro failed to incorporate any abuse-resistant features.17 
                                                     
 13. See David Sell, DEA to Tighten Control of a Type of Pain Pill, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Aug. 22, 2014, at A17 (“Hydrocodone alone had been a Schedule II drug 
since 1970, when Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act.”). 
 14. See Melissa Dribben, Suits Against Tylenol Maker Seek to Highlight 
Dangers, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 16, 2014, at G1; Deborah Franklin, Poisonings from 
a Popular Pain Reliever Are on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at F5; 
Matthew Perrone, Tylenol, Implicated in Liver Failure, Will Carry New Warning, 
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2013, at B7. 
 15. See Harry J. Gould, III & Dennis Paul, Hydrocodone Extended-Release: 
Pharmacodynamics, Pharmacokinetics and Behavioral Pharmacology of a 
Controversy, 91 PHARMACOLOGICAL RES. 99, 100-01 (2015); Keith Darcé, Late-
Stage Test Brings Success for Zogenix Pain Pill; Would Be First Such Drug Without 
Limits of Acetaminophen, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 18, 2011, at C1. 
 16. See Kevin Deutsch, It’s Purer—and Potent; Experts Fear New 
Painkiller Will Fuel Drug Abuse; Can Be 10 Times as Strong as Current Narcotics, 
NEWSDAY, Mar. 25, 2013, at A2; Bradley J. Fikes, Consumer Reports Analysis 
Criticizes Overuse of Opioids; Group Also Opposes Approval of San Diego 
Company’s Painkiller Zohydro ER, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 1, 2014, at C1 
(“[B]ecause Zohydro ER contains higher doses of hydrocodone than regular 
formulations, critics said it is more likely to be abused.”). 
 17. See Kristina Fiore & John Fauber, Zohydro Lacks Abuse Deterrent: 
FDA Did Not Require Safeguard for Painkiller, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 29, 
2013, at A1; Peter Loftus, Doctors Split on Benefits of Longer-Lasting New 
Painkiller, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2014, at D1; cf. Lewis S. Nelson et al., Editorial, 
6 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts responded aggressively 
to the imminent marketing of Zohydro. Although it had not 
encountered nearly the problems with OxyContin experienced by 
West Virginia and other states in the Appalachian region,18 officials 
in Massachusetts knew of that drug’s scourge,19 and they seemed 
determined to prevent a replay. On March 27, 2014, Governor Deval 
Patrick issued an emergency declaration authorizing the Department 
of Public Health to prevent sales of the drug in Massachusetts until 
the manufacturer addressed concerns about abuse and diversion, 
which the Commissioner of Health did later that same day.20 The 
FDA expressed dismay that a state would try to countermand its 
judgment in this fashion,21 and Zogenix lodged various constitutional 
                                                                                                                
Addressing the Opioid Epidemic, 314 JAMA 1453, 1453 (2015) (“New opioid 
medications, many of them with tamper-resistant formulations, continue to be 
marketed despite the lack of evidence that these preparations reduce the risk of 
addiction.”); Alan Schwarz, Painkillers Resist Abuse, but Experts Still Worry; 
Inventive Addicts Thwart Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2015, at A16 (reporting 
some concerns about the limitations of such features). This would come later. See 
infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Aron J. Hall et al., Patterns of Abuse Among Unintentional 
Pharmaceutical Overdose Fatalities, 300 JAMA 2613, 2617-19 (2008) (focusing on 
West Virginia); see also Bridget M. Kuehn, CDC: Major Disparities in Opioid 
Prescribing Among States: Some States Crack Down on Excess Prescribing, 312 
JAMA 684, 685 (2014) (“[I]t’s not clear why opioids and benzodiazepines are 
prescribed more in the South.”). 
 19. See Yasmeen Abutaleb, State Ranks Low in Prescribing of Opioids; 
Long-Acting Pills an Exception, BOS. GLOBE, July 2, 2014, at A1; Tracy Jan, 
Critics’ Calls for Tougher Pain Pills Are Resisted; Want Drug Makers, FDA to Act 
to Help Stem Opiate Abuse, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 19, 2014, at A1; Elizabeth Mehren, 
Hooks of “Hillbilly Heroin”: Abuse of Prescription Painkiller OxyContin Ravages 
Poor Areas in the East, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at A1 (“Since April, more than 
100 Boston-area pharmacies have been robbed of OxyContin. The robbers demand 
nothing else: not even cash . . . .”); see also Brian MacQuarrie, Governor Declares 
an Emergency on Opiate Abuse, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2014, at A1 (“Opiate 
overdoses in Massachusetts rose 90 percent from 2000 to 2012, the governor said.”). 
 20. See Bradley J. Fikes, Massachusetts Bans Painkiller Zohydro ER; 
Zogenix Takes Issue with Action, Which Applies to All Pure-Hydrocodone Drugs, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 29, 2014, at C1. Other states contemplated doing so 
as well. See Jon Kamp, New Painkiller Sparks Abuse Concern, WALL ST. J., May 
24, 2014, at A3 (“Lawmakers in Ohio and New York recently proposed measures 
that would effectively ban Zohydro by classifying it as a drug akin to heroin or 
LSD.”); id. (“The manufacturer has . . . argued against legislation for state-level 
bans in New York and Ohio, which legal experts said could prove hard to defend 
because they counter a federal agency.”). 
 21. See Fikes, supra note 20, at C1 (“[T]he [FDA] said state and 
congressional actions to unilaterally determine the legal status of various 
medications are ‘extremely troubling.’”); see also Michael McCarthy, FDA Chief 
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objections to what commentators characterized as an unprecedented 
move.22 
Less than one month later, the federal district court in 
Massachusetts sided with Zogenix, issuing a preliminary injunction 
against the Commonwealth.23 Although the court’s order naturally 
offered only a limited discussion of the constitutional issues, Judge 
Rya Zobel concluded that the congressional statute governing the 
approval of new drugs impliedly preempted the state’s action.24 She 
ruled that a prohibition on the sale of an FDA-approved product in a 
particular state probably would stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of federal purposes, which she understood as 
“mak[ing] drugs available to promote . . . the public health.”25 Judge 
                                                                                                                
Defends Zohydro Approval as US States Rebel, 348 BMJ g2939 (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2939 [https://perma.cc/VNK3-7UW4]. The FDA 
Commissioner later penned a commentary to this effect. See Margaret A. Hamburg, 
Opinion, FDA Combats Opioid Abuse, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 2014, at 8A 
(“Zohydro is a very small fraction of the opioid marketplace. Singling out any 
individual opioid diverts the nation’s focus from interventions that can make a real 
difference.”). Her former deputy offered a somewhat less sanguine assessment. See 
Yngvild Olsen & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Chronic Pain, Addiction, and Zohydro, 370 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2061, 2063 (2014); see also Editorial, Patrick’s Drug Ban Shows 
Need for More Non-Opioid Painkillers, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 7, 2014, at A10 
(applauding the state’s action even while conceding that “[o]verruling the FDA—in 
effect, nullifying federal health policy—is no small matter”). 
 22. See Travis Andersen, Patrick Asks Ban on Drug Be Upheld: But 
Painkiller Zohydro Was Approved by FDA, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 12, 2014, at B2; 
Brady Dennis, U.S. Judge Set to Rule on Drug Firm’s Suit Against Massachusetts 
over Painkiller Ban, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2014, at A4; Michael Ollove, Fearing 
Abuse, States Target Painkiller: Local Limits on Zohydro Challenge the FDA on 
Protecting the Public, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 2014, at N8 (calling it “perhaps the first 
time a state has ever tried to ban a drug approved by the FDA”); Milton J. Valencia, 
State Defends Ban on New Drug; Zohydro’s Maker Seeks Injunction, BOS. GLOBE, 
Apr. 15, 2014, at B1 (“No other state is believed to have banned a drug that has 
already been approved by the” FDA.). 
 23. See Brady Dennis, Judge Voids Ban on Painkiller in Mass.; State 
Claimed Zohydro’s Pure Hydrocodone Is an Addiction Risk, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 
2014, at A3; Milton J. Valencia, US Judge Blocks State Ban on Opiate; Critics Say 
Zohydro Could Be Misused, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2014, at B1. 
 24. Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2 
(D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014). At this point, Murray the muppet from Sesame Street 
might intone that “today’s episode was brought to you by the letter Z.” 
 25. Id. (“The FDA endorsed Zohydro ER’s safety and effectiveness when it 
approved the drug. . . . If the Commonwealth were able to countermand the FDA’s 
determinations and substitute its own requirements, it would undermine the FDA’s 
ability to make drugs available to promote and protect the public health.”). Notably, 
Judge Zobel never suggested finding implied conflict preemption premised instead 
on an impossibility of dual compliance. 
8 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
Zobel distinguished cases that had rejected an implied preemption 
defense to inadequate warning claims in tort litigation:  
Here, the obstruction is clearer because the drug Massachusetts wants 
Zogenix to adopt—Zohydro ER with an “abuse-resistant formulation”—
has not been approved . . . . Zogenix would be required to return to the 
FDA and seek approval of a drug different from the one the FDA has 
already deemed safe.26  
Forecasting that Zogenix was likely to prevail on the merits, and 
finding the other factors for granting preliminary relief satisfied, 
Judge Zobel issued an injunction; she did not have to reach the 
plaintiff’s dormant Commerce Clause and other constitutional 
arguments.27 
Although Judge Zobel’s instincts seem entirely correct, it takes 
little effort to quibble with her characterization of the purposes 
underlying federal law. Congress crafted the current version of the 
licensing scheme for new drugs in order to prevent the introduction 
of unsafe or ineffective pharmaceutical products, and, when it did so, 
the legislation included language that appeared to preserve state 
authority:  
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act [FDCA] shall be construed as invalidating any 
provision of State law which would be valid in the absence of such 
amendments unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such 
amendments and such provision of State law.28  
The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) contains similar 
language.29 In displacing state law only to the extent that “a direct 
                                                     
 26. Id. (rejecting as well the defendants’ argument that “federal regulation 
is a floor, not a ceiling; if states wish to regulate over and above federal regulations, 
they may do so”). 
 27. See id. at *2 n.2; see also infra Section II.B (elaborating on the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine). 
 28. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 
793. Even subsequently adopted express preemption provisions governing other 
therapeutic products regulated by the FDA provide for some flexibility. See 21 
U.S.C. § 360k(b)(2)(A) (2012) (allowing states to seek waivers of preemption for 
medical devices where “required by compelling local conditions”); id. § 379r(b)(1) 
(allowing states to seek waivers for nonprescription drug products where a 
nonidentical requirement “protects an important public interest that would otherwise 
be unprotected, including the health and safety of children” and “would not unduly 
burden interstate commerce”). 
 29. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (displacing state law only when “there is a 
positive conflict . . . so that the two cannot consistently stand together”); see also 
City of Hartford v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 1339, 1341 (Conn. 1993) (explaining that this 
section, “the antipreemption provision of the Controlled Substances Act, evidences 
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and positive conflict” exists, Congress expressed an intent that 
arguably forecloses implied preemption absent an impossibility of 
dual compliance—not because it can dictate how the federal courts 
apply the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution but by announcing a 
lack of any broader purpose to interfere with state authority. In 
contrast, the FDA’s subsequently codified—and entirely 
aspirational—mission statement,30 which Judge Zobel had quoted,31 
hardly supports her claim of an overriding federal purpose to 
promote patient access to approved drugs. 
Congress has maintained the FDA’s stringent system for new 
drug approval in spite of frequent complaints that these requirements 
erect undue barriers to the prompt introduction of valuable 
pharmaceuticals.32 On occasion, it has lowered the threshold for 
licensure in order to serve significant unmet patient needs,33 but these 
narrow exceptions only reinforce understanding the more general 
rules as designed to restrict rather than promote ready patient access. 
On even rarer occasions, the FDA has actively encouraged 
                                                                                                                
the fact that Congress specifically considered the issue of concurrent state 
proceedings and decided to allow them”). 
 30. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-115, § 406(a), 111 Stat. 2296, 2369 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 393(b) (2012)). 
 31. See Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2. Even if this purpose does not 
animate the FDA’s organic statute, Judge Zobel correctly considered issues of 
access for legitimate patients in assessing the other factors relevant to deciding 
whether to grant preliminary relief. See id. (“As to the equities, although the ban 
may prevent someone from misusing the drug, the ban prevents all in need of its 
special attributes from receiving the pain relief Zohydro ER offers. For the same 
reason, the injunction is in the public interest.”). 
 32. See Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation’s Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling 
Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 748 (2003) (“Over the 
years, critics have blamed the FDA’s lengthy and demanding approval process for 
creating a ‘drug lag’ that delayed pharmaceutical products already approved in 
Europe and elsewhere from reaching the United States market.”); Scott Gottlieb, 
Opinion, The FDA Is Evading the Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2010, at A17 
(“Europeans are now approving novel drugs an average of three months more 
rapidly than we do.”); see also Sabrina Tavernise, Bill to Speed Approvals for Drugs 
Is Cut Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2015, at A16 (describing the latest congressional 
proposals to streamline the process). 
 33. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 356 (West 2015) (delineating various expedited 
approval procedures for drugs intended to treat serious or life-threatening diseases); 
id. § 356-1 (same, for countermeasures to bioterror agents); see also Notice of 
Availability, Guidance for Industry on Expedited Programs for Serious 
Conditions—Drugs and Biologics, 79 Fed. Reg. 31,117 (May 30, 2014); Stephanie 
M. Lee, FDA Speeds up Approval of Drug Breakthroughs, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 4, 
2014, at A1. 
10 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
companies to seek approval for particular drugs, but generally the 
agency leaves those choices to the private sector.34 Contrast the 
FDA’s largely agnostic stance about the introduction of 
pharmaceutical products—and, even more so, the often grudging 
approach of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to the 
down-scheduling of controlled substances35—with the 
recommendations sometimes issued by the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) favoring, for instance, the use of 
certain vaccines.36 
                                                     
 34. See Noah, supra note 1, at 578 (“Usually, the FDA reviews whatever 
new drug applications happen to come in the door, but, on occasion, it actively 
recruits companies to seek approval for a product that the agency wants to see 
brought to market.”). In contrast, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) generously 
fund and license research into drugs that the government wants to see brought to 
market. See NOAH, supra note 4, at 1048-49; Alice Dembner, Public Handouts 
Enrich Drug Makers, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1998, at A1 (“NIH spent at least $1 
billion on drug and vaccine development in fiscal 1996, but took in only $27 million 
in royalties from all products.”). 
 35. See Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain 
Management Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 60 (2003); id. at 61 (“The 
[DEA] also has shown less deference to medical practitioners and the regulatory 
prerogative of the states, instead seeming to regard them with some suspicion.”); see 
also id. at 55 (“[B]oth agencies have shown a marked resistance to making narcotics 
available as analgesic products, though the FDA has better appreciated the value of 
providing patients with a wide range of options for treating pain.”). 
Traditionally, the FDA has adopted a clinical (or individualistic) mindset, 
leaving most of the difficult risk-benefit judgments in the hands of health 
care professionals and patients. . . . Conversely, the DEA’s law 
enforcement mindset goes to the opposite extreme, giving perhaps undue 
weight to the negative externalities associated with access to narcotics and 
not trusting health care professionals. A public health perspective, [as 
exemplified by] the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention . . . , 
might help to mediate between these two potentially incompatible 
perspectives. 
Id. at 64; see also id. at 60-61 (“This distribution of regulatory authority, between a 
traditional law enforcement agency and one that focuses on patient health, can 
generate incongruities.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Raymond A. Strikas, Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices Recommended Immunization Schedules for Persons Aged 0 Through 18 
Years—United States, 2015, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 93 (2015). In 
connection with opioid drugs, however, the CDC recently sought to discourage their 
overuse; its new guidelines recommend, among other things, that primary care 
physicians first try nonopioid therapies—and then prescribe only a three- to seven-
day course of opioids—when treating patients with acute pain. See Deborah Dowell 
et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain—United States, 
2016, 315 JAMA (forthcoming Apr. 2016); Sabrina Tavernise, New Standards for 
Painkillers Aim to Stem Overdose Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2016, at A1 
(summarizing some of the controversy surrounding the issuance of these technically 
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Thus, federal drug approval requirements create a fairly 
stringent barrier to entry designed to guard against the marketing of 
worthless or unduly dangerous therapeutic agents.37 Moreover, 
sponsors of genuinely promising investigational products can decide 
not to seek FDA approval;38 even if they do so (and ultimately 
succeed), license holders generally have no obligation to 
commercialize their products,39 to do so at an affordable price,40 or in 
                                                                                                                
nonbinding guidelines, and forecasting that they will prove to be highly influential); 
id. (“The federal government has lagged the states in its response to the opioid 
epidemic.”). 
 37. In fact, incumbent firms may take advantage of such strict licensing 
requirements to block rivals. See Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the 
Integrity of the Regulatory Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (1995) (illustrating 
different ways of manipulating the drug approval process for anticompetitive 
purposes); id. at 19-20 (explaining that “opportunities for deterring market entry [by 
potential competitors] may have been part of the political bargain struck between 
lawmakers and regulated entities”). 
 38. See Bruce M. Psaty & Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Stopping Medical 
Research to Save Money: A Broken Pact with Researchers and Patients, 289 JAMA 
2128, 2129-30 (2003) (questioning the ethics of halting clinical trials solely for 
commercial reasons); Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public 
Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 395-
96 (2002) (suggesting that Amgen had shelved a patent on a protein binding factor 
that would have dramatically slowed the excretion—and therefore the dosages 
needed—of its blockbuster anemia drug Epogen®); id. at 411-12 (discussing 
antitrust claim brought against analgesic drug manufacturer after it had acquired but 
then restricted the sales of a competitor’s medical device used for pain relief); see 
also Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming the 
denial of a preliminary injunction that would have ordered the sponsor of a 
completed (and unsuccessful) clinical trial of Iplex for muscular dystrophy to 
support a former subject’s application to the FDA for a compassionate use 
exemption to continue taking the abandoned investigational drug). 
 39. See William M. Janssen, A “Duty” to Continue Selling Medicines, 40 
AM. J.L. & MED. 330, 342, 346-47, 364-66 (2014) (explaining that federal courts had 
summarily and correctly rejected the claim—asserted by plaintiffs in tort litigation 
after patients had lost access to critical drugs because of supply shortages—that 
FDA approval obligated license holders to continue selling their products); id. at 363 
(“Existing law, however creatively repackaged, does not impose upon 
pharmaceutical manufacturers a ‘duty’ to keep selling their medicines.”); Noah, 
supra note 32, at 747 (explaining that drug manufacturers sometimes must give the 
FDA advance notice of supply interruptions); see also Noah, supra note 11, at 168-
70 (identifying anticompetitive reasons why manufacturers may decide to cease 
marketing an older FDA-approved product). 
 40. See Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative 
Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. 89, 129 (2014) (explaining that “the 
FDA has no business trying to influence decisions about what prices companies 
charge for products subject to its jurisdiction”). 
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a manner that ensures easy access.41 Lastly, FDA approval does not 
invariably guarantee insurance coverage, even by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),42 an agency housed 
alongside the FDA in the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS). In short, approval of a new drug application represents a 
necessary but hardly sufficient condition for patient access. 
If, in fact, these rather different purposes underlie drug 
approval requirements, then the argument for obstacle preemption 
loses much of its force. After all, many observers had misgivings 
about the wisdom of the FDA’s risk-benefit judgment on Zohydro, 
and public health officials in Massachusetts had decided to take more 
seriously concerns about abuse and diversion, especially in light of 
doubts about the need for yet another powerful opioid analgesic. 
Then again, to the extent that Congress intended for the FDA to 
make definitive and nationally uniform judgments about the safety 
and effectiveness of pharmaceutical products,43 state efforts to 
second-guess the agency’s determinations certainly would threaten to 
frustrate those somewhat different purposes.44 
                                                     
 41. See Lars Noah, Treat Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for 
What Ails American Health Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 360-62, 365, 383-91 
(2006) (explaining that drug manufacturers generally prefer prescription status when 
first launching a new product, and arguing that the FDA could not switch it to 
nonprescription status over the license holder’s objections). 
 42. See Lars Noah, Coerced Participation in Clinical Trials: Conscripting 
Human Research Subjects, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 333 & n.16 (2010). 
 43. See Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and 
Politics, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 39 (1993) (“For better or for worse, the FDA 
is the agency that the public has empowered to make authoritative judgments of this 
kind on its behalf.”). See generally Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 
92 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (suggesting obstacle and even field preemption). 
 44. See Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165-68 (1978) (holding 
that a federal statute and implementing regulations promulgated by the Secretary of 
Transportation, which required vessels to secure certificates of inspection 
establishing compliance with those standards, impliedly preempted Washington’s 
more stringent design requirements for oil tankers because they posed an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of Congress’s goal of uniformity); id. at 164 (“Congress did not 
anticipate that a vessel found to be in compliance with the Secretary’s design and 
construction regulations and holding a Secretary’s permit, or its equivalent, to carry 
the relevant cargo would nevertheless be barred by state law from operating in the 
navigable waters of the United States on the ground that its design characteristics 
constitute an undue hazard.”). For unanimous Supreme Court decisions holding 
similarly in later cases, see United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108-16 (2000) 
(invalidating Washington’s revised limits on oil tanker operation and personnel); 
Barnett Bank of Marion Cty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31-38 (1996) (invalidating a 
Florida statute that prohibited national banks from selling insurance in small towns 
where a federal statute had authorized such conduct); and California v. FERC, 495 
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Rather than continue litigating the case to secure a decision on 
the merits and possibly appeal (which might have allowed the courts 
to better assess these and other nuances), Massachusetts issued new 
rules that focused instead on the behavior of medical professionals 
licensed by the state: Before prescribing Zohydro, physicians would, 
among others things, have to check patient records for any evidence 
of substance abuse, and they then would have to prepare a letter of 
medical necessity (attesting, for instance, that other pain 
management treatments had failed) without which pharmacists could 
not dispense the drug.45 In an amended complaint, Zogenix 
characterized these new rules as amounting to “a de facto ban,” and 
the federal district court found even some of these more limited 
restrictions problematic.46 
Judge Zobel explained that the letter of medical necessity 
requirement suffered from various ambiguities and could mean that, 
contrary to the labeling approved by the FDA, physicians should use 
Zohydro only as a drug of last resort.47 Finding a probability of 
implied preemption because such an interpretation would frustrate 
the federal decision to make this product available for health 
professionals to use whenever they deemed it appropriate, she 
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of this rule pending clarification 
from the defendants.48 As for the company’s challenge to a related 
state rule that allowed only licensed pharmacists to handle Zohydro 
                                                                                                                
U.S. 490, 506-07 (1990) (“[A]llowing California to impose the challenged 
[minimum stream flow] requirements would be contrary to congressional intent 
regarding the Commission’s licensing authority and would constitute a veto of the 
[dam] project that was approved and licensed by FERC.”). Section II.A further 
elaborates on such arguments. 
 45. See Bradley J. Fikes, Zogenix Fights New Restrictions; S.D. Biotech to 
Ask Court to Stop Mass. Rules for Painkiller Zohydro ER, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
June 10, 2014, at C2; Milton J. Valencia, State Limits Use of Potent Painkiller; 
Addiction Concerns Raised on Zohydro, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2014, at B1; see also 
Ollove, supra note 22, at N8 (“[Gov.] Patrick responded to his loss in court by 
slapping other restrictions on Zohydro, beyond those mandated by the federal 
government. . . . Next door in Vermont, Democratic Gov. Peter Shumlin has already 
taken similar steps.”). 
 46. See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 3339610, at 
*3-5 (D. Mass. July 8, 2014), vacated in part, 2014 WL 4273251 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 
2014). 
 47. See id. at *4. 
 48. See id. at *5. Strangely, apart from finding a probability of success on 
the merits, Judge Zobel said nothing about the other three prerequisites for granting 
preliminary relief even though her brief discussion of these factors when initially 
enjoining the outright prohibition would hardly apply with equal force to the 
prescribing restrictions. 
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(thereby barring pharmacy technicians or interns from doing so), 
Judge Zobel found insufficient evidence to justify a preliminary 
injunction on grounds of implied preemption.49 She also summarily 
rejected an equal protection claim asserted by Zogenix, which had 
alleged that the defendants lacked any rational basis for singling out 
their drug from all of the other long-acting opioids.50 Less than two 
months later, after the defendants issued revised rules clarifying what 
should appear in the medical necessity letter, Judge Zobel vacated 
her previous order: Instead of having to declare that other pain 
management options had “failed,” now physicians simply would 
have to refer to the “inadequa[cy]” of alternatives for a particular 
patient, which essentially mimicked the FDA-approved labeling and 
therefore avoided implied preemption.51 
Even more so than her preemption analysis when preliminarily 
enjoining the outright ban, Judge Zobel offered a questionable 
explanation of how the prescribing and dispensing restrictions might 
conflict with federal law. She properly conceded that uncertainty 
about how state officials might interpret these rules made it difficult 
to discern whether they genuinely would frustrate federal purposes,52 
but, even absent any such contingency (in short, assume that 
Massachusetts unmistakably had narrowed the circumstances of use 
                                                     
 49. See id. (concluding that Zogenix had failed to “provide sufficient detail 
that pharmacies will not carry Zohydro”). 
 50. See id. at *2 n.3 (explaining that the Supreme Court has reserved so-
called “class-of-one” equal protection claims for situations where clear standards 
exist against which to measure individual departures made by regulatory 
classifications rather than discretionary judgments that depend on particularized 
assessments). Judge Zobel also again declined to reach the plaintiff’s Contract 
Clause and dormant Commerce Clause objections. See id. (calling these 
“undeveloped arguments”); see also Zogenix, Inc. v. Baker, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 
2015 WL 1206354, at *4-8 (D. Mass. Mar. 17, 2015) (declining to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s third amended complaint insofar as it again claimed implied preemption 
of the pharmacist-only handling restrictions, but granting the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the equal protection, Contract Clause, and dormant Commerce Clause 
objections to that rule). 
 51. See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 4273251, at 
*2-3 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2014). Having back-pedaled twice in response to 
preliminary injunctions, Massachusetts officials evidently now plan to rely on better 
prescription monitoring of all opioids. See Stephanie Ebbert, New AG Seeks Tighter 
Prescription Monitoring: Drug Fight Is Top Healey Priority, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 5, 
2015, at A1; cf. Christopher Rowland, Groups Unite Against Curbing Painkillers; 
Industry, Doctors, Patients Lobby over Opiate Laws, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2014, at 
A1 (reporting some resistance to such initiatives). 
 52. See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 3339610, at 
*5 (D. Mass. July 8, 2014). 
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or otherwise imposed conditions on prescribing above and beyond 
those of federal law), it would not create nearly the same conflict as 
had the original prohibition on use. No doubt, as Judge Zobel 
explained, a tradition of state regulation of the medical profession 
does not exclude the possibility of preemptive federal involvement in 
the field,53 but she failed to recognize that Congress repeatedly had 
offered assurances that the FDA’s authority to license therapeutic 
products would not interfere with the practice of medicine.54 
Thus, and entirely apart from doubts about Judge Zobel’s view 
of the FDA’s licensing requirements as designed to “promote” the 
availability of approved pharmaceuticals,55 Congress evidently did 
not intend any such purpose to intrude upon the well-accepted 
powers of the states to regulate the activities of health care 
professionals. This legislative guidance seemingly renders obstacle 
preemption inapt,56 unless, of course, a state rule purporting to 
regulate drug prescribing or dispensing in fact represented a veiled 
prohibition on use of an approved product.57 In spite of its setbacks in 
the litigation, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health could 
                                                     
 53. See id. at *4. 
 54. See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling 
the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 166 n.74, 173 (2004); see also id. 
at 155 (“Congress repeatedly has announced its intention that federal officials take 
care not to interfere with the practice of medicine.”); id. at 171, 175-76, 180, 191 
n.179 (explaining that the FDA and the DEA defer to state decisions about who 
enjoys prescribing privileges). That article addressed the flipside of the problem 
considered here—namely, asking whether the Constitution might bar restrictive 
federal decisions in connection with therapeutic product licensure for posing an 
affront to state primacy in regulating health professionals. 
 55. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text. In contrast, when the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts decided to boycott most companies doing 
business with Burma (Myanmar), it plainly threw a monkey wrench into the 
flexibility that Congress thought the President needed in using economic sanctions 
in response to human rights abuses in that country, resulting in a unanimous decision 
from the Supreme Court in an implied preemption case. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-88 (2000); id. at 388-91 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (taking issue only with the majority’s repeated references to 
legislative history). 
 56. See Noah, supra note 54, at 166 (“[C]ourts have cited this provision 
[appearing in the Medicare statute] as evidence that Congress did not intend to 
preempt state laws related to the delivery of health care services to the elderly or the 
disabled.”); cf. id. at 167-68 (conceding that the inclusion of a “savings” clause 
would do so more clearly). 
 57. Cf. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1398 (2013) (“A 
State may not evade the pre-emptive force of federal law by resorting to creative 
statutory interpretation or description at odds with the statute’s intended operation 
and effect.”). 
16 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
find some solace in the fact that the FDA subsequently approved 
abuse-resistant versions of the pure hydrocodone product.58 
B. Previous Attempts to Bar FDA-Approved Drugs 
Although the actions taken against Zohydro by officials in 
Massachusetts were unusual, the effort to restrict the availability of a 
pharmaceutical product licensed by the federal government was 
hardly unprecedented. On rare occasions, states have tried to ban or 
limit access to FDA-approved drugs ranging from contraceptives to 
controlled substances, and jurors applying state tort law have 
imposed liability on manufacturers for marketing dangerous 
pharmaceuticals notwithstanding the fact that expert regulatory 
officials had decided to license their sale. These various illustrations 
differ, however, from permissive state laws—such as those 
purporting to authorize the medical use of marijuana—in the face of 
federal prohibitions against the sale or possession of a drug. 
One of the FDA’s most prominent licensing decisions, now 
more than half a century ago, prompted resistance from state 
officials. After the agency approved the first oral contraceptive in 
1960,59 some states attempted to limit or entirely bar access by 
enforcing longstanding prohibitions against the use of 
contraceptives.60 The United States Supreme Court invalidated these 
                                                     
 58. See Thomas M. Burton, Painkiller Maker Tries to Curb Abuse, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2014, at B9 (reporting that Zogenix had filed a supplemental approval 
application for such a formulation); Bradley J. Fikes, Painkiller Unit Sold for $100M 
Upfront; San Diego-Based Zogenix to Use Proceeds for Other Drug Trials, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 11, 2015, at C1; see also Lisa Girion, Powerful Painkiller 
Approved, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014, at A8 (reporting that Purdue Pharma, the 
manufacturer of OxyContin, had secured FDA approval for its abuse-resistant 
extended-release hydrocodone product Hysingla ER®). 
 59. See Melissa Bell, On the Pill for Half a Century; Oral Contraceptives 
Have Had Broad Social Impact, but Some Women Now Seek Alternatives, WASH. 
POST, May 11, 2010, at E1 (“It is hailed as one of the 10 greatest public-health 
accomplishments of the 20th century.”); Gardiner Harris, It Started More Than One 
Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at D1 (“The pill’s role in the maturing of the 
F.D.A. has often been overlooked . . . .”). 
 60. See Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 971 
(2014) (“While Connecticut and Massachusetts were alone in prohibiting all sale 
and distribution of contraceptives, more than half of the states in the nation joined 
them with statutes forbidding advertisements for contraceptives. Nearly one-third of 
the states, moreover, had laws permitting only certain authorized medical 
professionals to distribute contraceptives.” (footnotes omitted)); Peter Smith, 
Comment, The History and Future of the Legal Battle over Birth Control, 49 
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restrictions.61 Decades later, after the FDA approved an emergency 
contraceptive product in 1999, some states balked,62 partly because 
of suspicions that it may work by blocking implantation of a 
fertilized egg.63 Then, as federal officials grudgingly expanded 
nonprescription availability of this drug,64 some states sought to 
restrict access to it.65 
                                                                                                                
CORNELL L.Q. 275, 278 (1964) (counting half a dozen other states with complete 
bans at that time). 
 61. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (invalidating 
state law as infringing marital right of privacy); see also Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-91 (1977) (invalidating New York law that allowed only 
pharmacists to dispense OTC contraceptives); id. at 691-99 (plurality opinion) 
(invalidating provision that barred almost all contraceptive access for individuals 
under sixteen years of age); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447-55 (1972) 
(invalidating Massachusetts law that prohibited distribution to unmarried individuals 
as irrational under the Equal Protection Clause); infra notes 178-80 and 
accompanying text (elaborating on the basis for these decisions). See generally Ryan 
C. Williams, The Paths to Griswold, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2155 (2014). 
Although the introduction of oral contraceptives may have provided some of the 
impetus for challenging the old state laws, none of the cases decided by the Supreme 
Court focused on these powerful new hormonal agents (as opposed to older products 
such as condoms, diaphragms, and spermicides). Cf. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 463-64 
& n.4 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (contrasting FDA prescription 
requirements for the pill with state prescription requirements that would apply even 
to vaginal foam dispensed to a married person); id. at 469-71 & n.4 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (discussing same); Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the 
Connecticut Supreme Court Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 
936 (1990) (“The [New Haven] clinic served a heavy load of clients, and prescribed 
a variety of contraceptives, including the new birth control pills.”). 
 62. They did so indirectly by enacting “conscientious objector” laws that 
allowed pharmacists and other health care professionals to refuse to dispense or 
prescribe such drugs. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3 & -5 (2015); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2015); Angela K. Brown, Lawsuit Protection Helps 
South Dakota Druggists Bring Beliefs to Work, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1998, at C2; 
Monica Davey & Pam Belluck, Pharmacies Balk on After-Sex Pill and Widen Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at A1; see also Marcia D. Greenberger & Rachel 
Vogelstein, Pharmacist Refusals: A Threat to Women’s Health, 308 SCIENCE 1557, 
1558 (2005) (“Since 1997, 28 states have introduced legislation that would permit 
pharmacists to refuse to dispense, and sometimes to refer or transfer, drugs on the 
basis of moral or religious grounds.”). 
 63. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762-63, 
2765-66 (2014); Marc Kaufman, Plan B Battles Embroil States; Proposals Mirror 
Red-Blue Divide, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2006, at A1; see also Pam Belluck, No 
Abortion Role Seen for Morning-After Pill, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A1 
(reporting that concerns of an arguably abortifacient mechanism of action lack any 
scientific foundation). 
 64. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 198, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(declining to tolerate any further “agency filibuster”), stay granted in part, No. 13-
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In 2000, the FDA approved the controversial abortifacient drug 
mifepristone (Mifeprex®).66 Initially, it seemed that some states 
would try to forbid its sale.67 Although outright prohibitions never 
materialized, several states decided to impose restrictions on use of 
the drug,68 which have triggered challenges in the courts.69 Insofar as 
                                                                                                                
1690, 2013 WL 2435370 (2d Cir. June 5, 2013); id. at 208-09 (reiterating that the 
FDA’s decision was tainted by political interference, and calling the government’s 
arguments “frivolous and . . . taken for the purpose of delay”); Lisa Heinzerling, The 
FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927, 938-58 
(2014); Michael D. Shear & Pam Belluck, Obama to Drop Limit on Selling a 
Contraceptive, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A1 (“The fight to make emergency 
contraceptives universally available without a prescription is more than a decade 
old.”). 
 65. See Samantha Harper, Note, “The Morning After”: How Far Can States 
Go to Restrict Access to Emergency Contraception?, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
221, 222, 235-36 (2006); John Schwartz, Oklahoma: Birth Control Limit Halted, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2013, at A11 (“The Oklahoma Legislature subsequently 
passed a law that required purchasers to show identification and, if age 17 or under, 
to have a prescription.”). 
 66. See Gina Kolata, U.S. Approves Abortion Pill; Drug Offers More 
Privacy, and Could Reshape Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at A1; see also 
David Crary, Abortion Pill Remains Controversial, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2010, at A3 
(reporting that almost 1.4 million women in the U.S. have taken mifepristone in the 
first decade of availability, now accounting for about 15% of all abortions); Marc 
Kaufman, Abortion Foes Want RU–486 Pill Pulled; Deaths of Several Women Are 
Cited, WASH. POST, May 17, 2006, at A3 (reporting that opponents have lobbied 
Congress and petitioned the FDA to withdraw approval). 
 67. See Charles Ornstein, Abortion Pill’s Foes Shift Focus—Restrictions, 
Ban to Be Sought in States, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 30, 2000, at 1A; Charles 
Ornstein, Lawmakers Urge Restrictions on Abortion Pill, DALL. MORNING NEWS, 
Feb. 2, 2001, at 8A (reporting that a bill had been introduced in Oklahoma to ban 
sales); Stephanie Simon, Abortion Rights Group Challenges Mich. Law, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 27, 2001, at A12 (“16 states have introduced legislation to restrict the use of 
RU-486.”). A few states still have old laws on the books making it a crime to 
distribute abortifacient drugs. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:88 (2015); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 125.60 (McKinney 2015). 
 68. See Laurah J. Samuels, Note, Mifepristone Protocol Legislation—The 
Anti-Choice Movement’s Disingenuous Method of Attack on the Reproductive Rights 
of Women and How Courts Should Respond, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 316, 325-
30 (2014) (discussing statutes from Arizona, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
Texas); see also Sandhya Somashekhar, Abortion Pills Prescribed via Net Targeted, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2010, at A2 (“State legislators in Iowa and Nebraska have 
announced their intention to try to ban telemedicine abortions . . . .”). 
 69. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. 
Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 600-05 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting constitutional objections to 
Texas statute); Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 907-10, 
915-18 (9th Cir.) (concluding that plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction 
to block Arizona’s law), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 870 (2014); Planned Parenthood 
Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 513-18 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming 
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these states simply mandated strict adherence to the directions for 
use specified in the labeling approved by the FDA, even though the 
agency itself does not do so,70 they at least managed to avoid a direct 
confrontation with the federal licensing decision.71 
Miscellaneous other drugs approved by the FDA have 
encountered state-imposed limitations. For instance, in 1978, Illinois 
moved the analgesic pentazocine (Talwin®) from Schedule IV to the 
far more restrictive Schedule II.72 More than a dozen states added the 
muscle relaxant carisoprodol (Soma®) to their schedules of 
controlled substances before the federal government decided to 
                                                                                                                
summary judgment granted to Ohio officials); Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region 
v. DeWine, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1069-70 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (rejecting a motion to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ sole remaining constitutional objection related to the lack of a 
health exception in Ohio’s law); see also Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. 
v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252, 265-69 (Iowa 2015) (invalidating rule 
barring telemedicine to dispense mifepristone). These challenges claimed an undue 
burden on the abortion decision but did not raise any preemption arguments. 
 70. See Marc Kaufman, Death After Abortion Pill Reignites Safety Debate; 
Opponents Renew Drive to Ban Drug Woman Took, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2003, at 
A3; see also Eric A. Schaff et al., Vaginal Misoprostol Administered 1, 2, or 3 Days 
After Mifepristone for Early Medical Abortion, 284 JAMA 1948, 1952 (2000) (“A 
regimen that requires misoprostol to be given in an office setting 2 days after 
mifepristone, followed by 4 hours of observation, . . . is unnecessarily restrictive and 
creates scheduling and additional cost barriers to women.”); Sarah Lueck, Groups 
Offer Abortion-Drug Variations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at B2. See generally 
Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and 
Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 397-99 (2002) (discussing the 
FDA’s recognition of the legitimacy of “off-label” use). 
 71. In contrast, any more onerous restrictions would have confronted 
serious preemption (among other) objections: 
To the extent that recent Supreme Court [decisions] have reinvigorated 
implied preemption in cases where state law stands as an “obstacle” to the 
achievement of federal purposes, one could argue that any state efforts to 
prohibit or restrict distribution of mifepristone would create an 
impermissible conflict with federal law. After all, the Clinton 
administration actively encouraged the introduction of mifepristone in the 
U.S. market, and it took some unprecedented steps to facilitate FDA 
approval. It would not necessarily matter that the new administration fails 
to share the goals that inspired the agency’s earlier licensing decision. 
Noah, supra note 1, at 601 (footnote omitted). 
 72. See May Annexton, Pentazocine Reclassified in Illinois, 240 JAMA 
2234, 2234 (1978); see also Steve Sternberg, Growing Alarm over Migraine Drug’s 
Addictive Potential, USA TODAY, June 16, 1997, at 6D (reporting that ten states had 
listed the migraine headache drug butorphenol tartrate (Stadol®) as a controlled 
substance while the DEA had not yet done so even though its manufacturer and the 
FDA belatedly recommended such a classification). 
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follow suit in 2011.73 In 2006, responding to its use in cooking 
methamphetamine, Congress demanded that pseudoephedrine, an 
active ingredient previously found in numerous OTC cough-cold 
products, remain in an intermediate “behind-the-counter” status.74 A 
pair of states now require a prescription for pseudoephedrine,75 and 
Alabama went so far as to prohibit the sale of any products 
containing this ingredient unless they had incorporated abuse-
resistant features, though the state repealed this restriction four years 
later just before it would have taken effect.76 
                                                     
 73. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement of Carisoprodol 
into Schedule IV, 76 Fed. Reg. 77,330, 77,358 (Dec. 12, 2011) (codified as amended 
at 21 C.F.R. § 1308.14(c)(6) (2015)); id. at 77,342, 77,358 app. A (identifying 
seventeen states that had classified the drug as a controlled substance); Jennifer A. 
Fass, Carisprodol Legal Status and Patterns of Abuse, 44 ANNALS 
PHARMACOTHERAPY 1962, 1963 & tbl.1 (2010) (identifying eighteen states that had 
done so). Classification as a controlled substance would only amount to a ban if the 
drug gets assigned to Schedule I. 
 74. See Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 711(b)(1), 120 Stat. 192, 258-61 (2006) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 830(e) 
(2012)); see also id. § 711(g), 120 Stat. at 263 (savings clause); Note, Cooking up 
Solutions to a Cooked up Menace: Responses to Methamphetamine in a Federal 
System, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2508, 2519, 2524-29 (2006) (applauding Congress’s 
decision not to preempt more restrictive state laws). 
 75. See Abby Goodnough, States Battling Meth Makers Look to Limit 
Ingredients: Unable to Stop the Illicit Use of Decongestants, Officials Weigh 
Requiring Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2011, at A19 (“Faced with a surging 
methamphetamine problem, a number of states are weighing contentious bills this 
spring that would require a doctor’s prescription for popular decongestants like 
Sudafed. . . . Two states, Mississippi and Oregon, already require prescriptions 
. . . .”). Wholly apart from the operation of the express preemption clause for OTC 
drugs, such a requirement appears to represent a fairly direct conflict with federal 
law. See Noah, supra note 41, at 368 & n.53, 381-82. 
 76. See 2005 Ala. Laws 181 (H.B. 152) (codified at ALA. CODE § 20-2-
190(c)(1)(a) (2008)) (“On or after October 1, 2009, no product containing ephedrine 
or pseudoephedrine shall be sold in this state unless the product is manufactured in 
such a manner that the ephedrine or pseudoephedrine cannot be extracted so as to be 
used as an ingredient in the production of methamphetamine.”), repealed by 2009 
Ala. Laws 283 (S.B. 47). Thus, like the invalidated hydrocodone rule in 
Massachusetts, the state had sought to force manufacturers to reformulate products 
that satisfied FDA requirements. It would take a few years more before abuse-
resistant pseudoephedrine products (e.g., Nexafed® to replace Sudafed®) became 
available. See Albert W. Brzeczko et al., The Advent of a New Pseudoephedrine 
Product to Combat Methamphetamine Abuse, 39 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 
284, 289 (2013); Christine Byers, Drug Firm Sees Profit in Meth Bill: Missouri 
Measure Would Exempt Product Resistant to Meth Cooks’ Methods, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 2012, at A1; see also Jennifer Corbett Dooren, 
Decongestants Get Makeover to Keep Them over the Counter, WALL ST. J., May 9, 
2006, at D3 (explaining that incentives created by other restrictions had prompted 
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In some cases, states may legislate in anticipation of federal 
approval; for instance, with controversial new drugs intended for use 
in food-producing animals pending before the FDA, a few states 
enacted prohibitions.77 In other cases, states may act in anticipation 
of federal withdrawal of a previously issued license; for instance, just 
one week before the FDA decided to rescind approval,78 the Florida 
board of medicine severely restricted the use of the diet drugs 
fenfluramine (Pondimin®) and dexfenfluramine (Redux®).79 In sharp 
contrast, Tennessee’s board had entirely prohibited the use of these 
drugs starting in 1991, though the state legislature overrode that ban 
just months prior to the FDA’s withdrawal.80 In 2014, the Minnesota 
                                                                                                                
some manufacturers to replace pseudoephedrine with the somewhat less effective 
ingredient phenylephrine). 
 77. See Lars Noah, Whatever Happened to the “Frankenfish”?: The FDA’s 
Foot-Dragging on Transgenic Salmon, 65 ME. L. REV. 606, 614 (2013) (explaining 
that “some states already have acted preemptively against transgenic fish: a few 
banned their use in aquaculture within state borders”); Gregory D.L. Morris, Two 
States Enact BST Moratoria, CHEMICAL WK., May 9, 1990, at 10 (reporting that 
Wisconsin and Minnesota barred the use of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST) 
“for one year from the day of FDA approval”); Keith Schneider, U.S. Approves Use 
of Drug to Raise Milk Production, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1993, § 1, at 1 (“Thousands 
of farmers in the Upper Middle West joined with [activist Jeremy] Rifkin in a grass-
roots campaign that succeeded in persuading the state legislatures of Wisconsin and 
Minnesota three years ago to enact temporary moratoriums on the use of the drug in 
the event it was approved. The state moratoriums have since expired.”); see also 
Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free Zone: Federal and Local Interests in Regulating 
Recombinant BST, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227, 264 (1997) (“[L]egislation hostile to 
rbST might take the form of a ban on the hormone . . . . Although no such legislation 
is currently in force, some states enacted bans during the pendency of Monsanto’s 
application for FDA approval of rbST, and various states and localities have 
contemplated bans since approval was obtained.”); Lars Noah, Managing 
Biotechnology’s [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become Benign Neglect?, 
11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 40 (2006) (discussing rbST). 
 78. See Gina Kolata, 2 Top Diet Drugs Are Recalled Amid Reports of Heart 
Defects, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at A1; see also Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and 
Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, 
AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 124-32 (1999). 
 79. See Mark Maremont, Florida Moves to Restrict Use of Diet Drugs, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1997, at B12; see also Bill Bergstrom, State Ban of Fen-Phen 
to Become Permanent, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 30, 1997, at 5B. In contrast to 
Zohydro, however, this action came in response to emerging safety concerns not 
fully appreciated by the FDA when it originally had approved these drugs. See 
Gregory D. Curfman, Editorial, Diet Pills Redux, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 629 (1997) 
(summarizing these newly appreciated risks). In a sense, Florida simply beat the 
FDA to the punch. 
 80. See TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0880-02-.14(3)(C) (1992), superseded in 
part by statute, 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 236, § 3 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-
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legislature enacted a statute banning most uses of the antibacterial 
agent triclosan because of emerging safety concerns, but it 
specifically excluded products approved by the FDA for consumer 
use,81 which represents either a concession to the inability of a state 
to override a federal licensing decision or an overabundance of 
caution to avoid confronting an issue that might prompt litigation. 
In short, states have on occasion attempted to nullify FDA 
decisions to approve a product. The obverse situation—namely, state 
efforts to disregard federal nonapproval decisions—has attracted far 
more attention in recent years. In particular, nearly half of the states 
have adopted laws authorizing the medical use of marijuana 
notwithstanding its continued status as a Schedule I (illicit) drug 
under federal law,82 much less the failure of the FDA to approve its 
use.83 Similarly, after the FDA acted against amygdalin (Laetrile) in 
                                                                                                                
214(m)-(n) (2015)); Ann Hardie, The Diet Drug Debate: Weighing the Risks—
Millions Helped, but Worry Grows as Use Expands, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 5, 
1997, at C1 (“[T]he Tennessee Legislature [just] lifted a six-year ban on phen-fen 
because Tennessee residents were going to other states to get the pills.”). Because 
the 1991 regulation also had covered any derivative forms of fenfluramine, it 
prevented the prescribing of Redux immediately upon the FDA’s approval of that 
drug in 1996. 
 81. See 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 277, § 8(2) (May 16, 2014) (codified at MINN. 
STAT. § 145.945(2) (2015)); Megan Gannon, Cancer Tied to Common Antibacterial 
Ingredient, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2014, at E5 (“Minnesota became the first state to 
pass a law banning triclosan, though that rule won’t go into effect until 2017.”); 
Brian Palmer, Ban on an Antimicrobial Ingredient Raises Questions, WASH. POST, 
June 3, 2014, at E6 (“It was a bold move, because the [FDA] is currently reviewing 
the safety and efficacy of triclosan. By acting now, Minnesota lawmakers effectively 
preempted the FDA.”). In 1997, the FDA had approved the use of triclosan in 
Colgate’s Total® toothpaste with a claim that it can help fight gingivitis. See 
Matthew Perrone, Popular Chemical Under FDA Review, BOS. GLOBE, May 3, 
2013, at B9. 
 82. See Kevin P. Hill, Medical Marijuana for Treatment of Chronic Pain 
and Other Medical and Psychiatric Problems: A Clinical Review, 313 JAMA 2474, 
2475 (2015) (“23 states and the District of Columbia have enacted medical 
marijuana laws to facilitate access to marijuana as a treatment for a variety of 
medical conditions.”); id. at 2476-77 tbl.1 (summarizing these various laws); see 
also Todd Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State Medical Marijuana Policies: A 
Threat to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (2013). Congress 
recently (and only partially) relented. See Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 
(2014) (providing that appropriations for the Department of Justice cannot be used 
to prevent the implementation of medical marijuana laws in thirty-two listed states 
and the District of Columbia). 
 83. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005) (“[T]he dispensing of new 
drugs, even when doctors approve their use, must await federal approval.”); Deepak 
Cyril D’Souza & Mohini Ranganathan, Editorial, Medical Marijuana: Is the Cart 
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the 1970s, numerous states legalized the use of this purported 
treatment for cancer.84 Like marijuana, amygdalin can be produced 
locally, typically by using apricot kernels; unlike marijuana, the drug 
does not qualify as a controlled substance, so mere possession would 
not violate federal law.85 
“Right to try” laws represent the most recent example of state 
legislation attempting to stake out a more permissive policy than has 
the federal government. Enacted in two dozen states and under 
consideration in several others, these laws purport to allow 
desperately ill patients to access investigational drugs not yet 
approved by the FDA.86 Although it has become somewhat more 
flexible about allowing terminally ill patients not enrolled in clinical 
trials to request supplies from manufacturers,87 the agency rejected 
broader initiatives that would routinely allow patient access before 
                                                                                                                
Before the Horse?, 313 JAMA 2431, 2431 (2015) (“For most of the conditions that 
qualify for medical marijuana use, the evidence fails to meet FDA standards.”); 
Noah, supra note 35, at 60 (“[U]nlike chemicals synthesized by pharmaceutical 
companies, the FDA could not effectively exercise its regulatory authority to 
demand proof of safety and efficacy over a raw product with variable composition 
that individuals can grow in their homes.”); Claire Frezza, Note, Medical 
Marijuana: A Drug Without a Medical Model, 101 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1134-38 (2013); 
Serge F. Kovaleski, Medical Marijuana Research Hits Wall of U.S. Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2014, at A4 (“[I]t does not see much potential for developing 
marijuana in smoked form into an approved prescription drug.”). 
 84. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979); see 
also Charles G. Moertel et al., A Clinical Trial of Amygdalin (Laetrile) in the 
Treatment of Human Cancer, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201, 201 (1982). 
 85. See Noah, supra note 54, at 187 n.162; see also Barrie Cassileth, 
Beyond the Mainstream: Laetrile by Any Other Name Is Still Bogus, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 2001, at F1; Marc Kaufman, FDA Is Moving to Halt Online Sales of Laetrile; 
Sites Promote Unapproved Cancer Therapy, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2000, at A2; cf. 
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., A New Strain of Yeast Can Produce Narcotics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 14, 2015, at A18 (reporting that, in spite of the latest advances in genetic 
engineering to allow for the production of the hydrocodone and other opioids in the 
laboratory rather than deriving them from opium poppies, there is no imminent 
danger of “home-brewed heroin” and the like). 
 86. See Naomi Lopez Bauman, Opinion, Cancer Moonshot Needs FDA to 
Get out of the Way, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 2016, at 7A; see also Rebecca Dresser, The 
“Right to Try” Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in the Access Debate, 93 
TEX. L. REV. 1631, 1640-47 (2015) (summarizing the debate over these measures); 
Kelly Servick, “Right to Try” Laws Bypass FDA for Last-Ditch Treatments, 344 
SCIENCE 1329, 1329 (2014). 
 87. See, e.g., Notice of Availability, Individual Patient Expanded Access 
Applications: Form FDA 3926; Draft Guidance for Industry, 80 Fed. Reg. 7318, 
7319 (Feb. 10, 2015); Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 
74 Fed. Reg. 40,900, 40,942-45 (Aug. 13, 2009) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312 & 
316 (2015)). 
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approval.88 Moreover, pharmaceutical companies sponsoring clinical 
trials of investigational drugs would violate federal law if they 
supplied such products to patients without first securing a waiver 
from the FDA, so these state laws seem to represent little more than 
symbolic gestures.89 In practice, the agency routinely grants such 
requests, but manufacturers may have entirely valid reasons not to 
seek waivers.90 Although these various more permissive state laws 
also demonstrate a lack of respect for the judgments of federal 
officials, the constitutional assessment developed in Part II focuses 
on the conflicts that arise when states opt for a more (as opposed to 
less) restrictive approach than the FDA.91 
                                                     
 88. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Seema 
Shah & Patricia Zettler, From a Constitutional Right to a Policy of Exceptions: 
Abigail Alliance and the Future of Access to Experimental Therapy, 10 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 135, 174-89 (2010) (critiquing proposals to further 
expand access). 
 89. See Patricia J. Zettler & Henry T. Greely, The Strange Allure of State 
“Right-to-Try” Laws, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1885, 1885 (2014); id. at 1886 
(drawing a parallel to the Zohydro dispute in Massachusetts); see also Jessie 
Hellmann, Bills Would Give Terminally Ill Access to Experimental Drugs, CHI. 
TRIB., Mar. 8, 2015, at A6 (“[E]ven backers of the idea say they don’t know of 
anyone who has benefited from recent [state] attempts to expand access.”); Julie 
Turkewitz, Patients Seek “Right to Try” New Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2015, at 
A16 (“The laws do not seem to have helped anyone obtain experimental medicine, 
as the drug companies are not interested in supplying unapproved medications 
outside the supervision of the F.D.A. But that seems almost beside the point to the 
Goldwater Institute, the libertarian group behind legislative efforts to pass Right to 
Try laws.”); id. (explaining that a new law in Colorado “does not require companies 
to provide the treatment, nor does it mandate that insurance companies cover it”). 
 90. See Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, In 3 States, Dying Patients 
Will Soon Get the “Right to Try” Unproven Drugs, WASH. POST, May 17, 2014, at 
A3 (“It’s unclear how many drugmakers might be willing to make use of the state 
laws at the risk of angering federal regulators.”); Peter Loftus & Dan Frosch, States 
Open to Drug Options—Expanding Experimental Therapies to the Dying Gains 
Traction Among Lawmakers, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2014, at A3 (“Drug makers and 
the FDA have expressed concerns about the state proposals.”); id. (“Providing early 
access to experimental drugs poses a dilemma for companies and federal regulators 
who don’t want to jeopardize patient safety or the integrity of clinical trials needed 
to get new drugs on the market.”); Katie Thomas, Company Creates Panel for 
Access to Trial Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2015, at A1 (“The F.D.A. typically signs 
off on use of unapproved drugs, but not until the company agrees. But [for a variety 
of reasons] saying yes is not so simple . . . .”). 
 91. Interestingly, one scholar who has focused on marijuana laws viewed 
this mirror-image problem as relatively uncomplicated. See Robert A. Mikos, On the 
Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to 
Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1422 (2009) (“When Congress 
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Products liability litigation offers another illustration of this 
problem.92 Under state tort law, a few courts have allowed juries to 
find that an FDA-approved drug suffered from a defective design, 
which amounts to a conclusion that the manufacturer should never 
have marketed this particular pharmaceutical product 
notwithstanding the favorable judgment of an expert regulatory 
agency.93 For instance, in Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, 
Inc.,94 a pregnant woman developed serious cardiac problems while 
taking ritodrine (Yutopar®). The plaintiff prevailed at trial on her 
design defect and failure-to-warn claims, after her experts identified 
numerous methodological flaws in the clinical trials submitted to the 
FDA, which members of the agency’s advisory committee also had 
criticized. The federal appellate court in Tobin affirmed, concluding 
that, notwithstanding the fact of FDA approval (and the absence of 
any evidence of fraud in securing that approval or contrary 
postapproval data), the jury could have decided that the manufacturer 
should never have marketed the drug because it had no good 
evidence of effectiveness in improving neonatal outcomes.95 
                                                                                                                
legalizes a private activity that has been banned by the states, the application of the 
Supremacy Clause is relatively straightforward: barring contrary congressional 
intent, such state laws are unenforceable . . . .”); id. at 1426 (emphasizing the need 
“to distinguish between (1) federal laws authorizing conduct banned by the states 
(under which state power is significantly constrained), and (2) federal laws banning 
conduct authorized by the states (under which states wield considerably more 
power)”); id. at 1480 (elaborating on this distinction); see also Ernest A. Young, 
Modern-Day Nullification: Marijuana and the Persistence of Federalism in an Age 
of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 791 (2015). 
 92. More typically, nullification refers to the power of jurors to disregard 
applicable law as instructed by a judge. See Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1603-06 (2001); cf. Sanford Levinson, The Twenty-First 
Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession in American Political Rhetoric: 
Frivolousness Incarnate or Serious Arguments to Be Wrestled with?, 67 ARK. L. 
REV. 17, 43-44 (2014) (contrasting jury nullification with efforts by state officials to 
resist federal law). In the cases discussed here, however, state law expressly invites 
jurors to disregard the licensing decisions of federal agency experts. 
 93. See Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 
74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 852 (2009) (“A conclusion that a prescription drug has a 
design defect may well amount to a command that would deprive other patients of 
access to the product.”); see also id. at 851 (“One central objection to the 
recognition of a broader form of ‘product category’ liability is that it would allow 
courts to decide that lawfully marketed products should not be available to 
consumers.”). 
 94. 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying Kentucky law). 
 95. See id. at 537-40; see also Wimbush v. Wyeth, 619 F.3d 632, 641-46 
(6th Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment granted to the defendant on the basis 
of implied preemption of a negligence claim under Ohio law brought on behalf of a 
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Somewhat remarkably, the Products Liability Restatement cited 
Tobin with approval.96 
Indeed, if a patient experienced a side effect while taking 
Zohydro that the manufacturer had adequately warned about, then 
(under the tort law of Massachusetts as elsewhere) he or she could 
claim a defective design in this drug given the availability of safer 
substitutes.97 The prospect that such a claim might succeed, and that 
it could lead to the imposition of a hefty fine (i.e., an award of 
damages),98 would make manufacturers think twice before marketing 
an FDA-approved drug—in fact, that is precisely the stated goal of 
those who favor allowing jury scrutiny in such circumstances.99 In 
                                                                                                                
patient who died from primary pulmonary hypertension asserting that the 
manufacturer should never have brought the diet drug Redux® (dexfenfluramine) to 
market notwithstanding receipt of FDA approval with labeling that warned of 
precisely this risk); id. at 645 (favorably citing Tobin as involving a case of “pre-
approval design defect”). For my detailed critique of Tobin, see Noah, supra note 
93, at 869-71 (concluding that the court “turned a complex risk-utility judgment, 
using data from less than ideal clinical trials, into a no-brainer by allowing the jury 
to conclude that the drug was totally ineffective”). 
 96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. f & 
illus. 1 (1998); see also id. cmt. b, at 146 (“[U]nqualified deference to these 
regulatory mechanisms is considered by a growing number of courts to be 
unjustified. An approved prescription drug or medical device can present significant 
risks without corresponding advantages.”); James A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription 
Drug Design Liability Under the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A 
Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 492 (1996) (conceding that 
section 6(c) “allows courts to second-guess the FDA on the . . . question of whether 
a drug approved by the FDA and marketed by a defendant should not have been 
approved and marketed,” though trusting that that would occur “only in relatively 
rare cases”); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Essay, Drug Designs 
Are Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 174 (2001) (“By countenancing a finding that a 
defendant’s drug is, essentially, worthless, section 6(c) tacitly assumes that the FDA 
will occasionally approve (or fail to order withdrawal of) a drug that should not be 
allowed on the market.”). 
 97. See Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against 
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1123-24 (2014); Noah, supra 
note 93, at 844-48, 862-63. 
 98. See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of 
Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2159 (2000) (“The [U.S. 
Supreme] Court recognized that damage awards predicated on a manufacturer’s 
departure from the common-law standard of reasonable care potentially have as 
much of a regulatory effect as positive law requirements reflected in state statutes or 
rules.”). 
 99. See id. (“Critics of the regulatory compliance defense respond that a tort 
judgment does not dictate any alteration of primary conduct, but in the next breath 
they emphasize the need to retain the threat of liability to serve a deterrent function 
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that case, state law appears to pose much the same conflict as if 
opposition to the sale of an FDA-approved product had emanated 
from the executive or legislative branch.100 Although the Supreme 
Court has decided that manufacturers of medical devices may invoke 
an express preemption clause as a defense to tort claims so long as 
their product has secured a full license from the FDA,101 it has not 
extended similar protection to manufacturers of approved drug 
products given Congress’s failure to so specify in statute.102 
II. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS 
Although it continues to make references back to the Zohydro 
litigation, this Part considers more generally the potential 
constitutional obstacles to state efforts at banning FDA-approved 
drug products: implied preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine, and principles of substantive due process. In a handful of 
cases addressing challenges to state laws applied to the sale and use 
of pharmaceuticals, the United States Supreme Court has offered 
some guidance that may help to clarify the extent to which state 
officials can attempt to countermand FDA licensing judgments. 
A. Implied Preemption 
As explained previously, Judge Zobel’s implied preemption 
analysis in the Zohydro litigation suffered from any number of 
                                                                                                                
given the often inconsequential administrative sanctions. They can’t have it both 
ways.”). 
 100. See id. at 2160 (“[J]uries indirectly—and inconsistently—but 
unmistakably do set product safety standards in this country. Once we accept the 
notion that jurors effectively regulate with their verdicts, one may ask whether this 
arrangement makes sense.”); Noah, supra note 93, at 851-52 (elaborating). 
 101. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 322-30 (2008); see also 
Noah, supra note 93, at 913 (suggesting that preemption “may better define those 
contexts where courts should decline to engage in duplicative design defect 
review—namely, those devices that have undergone full premarket review and 
approval, at least where the FDA has made a particular judgment about a feature 
challenged by the plaintiff”). 
 102. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567-81 (2009); see also Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle, or Creeping to 
Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REV. 197, 210-17, 220-30 (2009); Douglas G. Smith, 
Preemption After Wyeth v. Levine, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1435, 1458-80 (2009); David 
C. Vladeck, Deconstructing Wyeth v. Levine: The New Limits on Implied Conflict 
Preemption, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 883, 904-18 (2009). Section II.A discusses an 
important exception. 
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weaknesses.103 Nonetheless, the Supremacy Clause may still operate 
to erect a constitutional barrier against state efforts to prohibit the 
sale of FDA-approved products. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution 
provides that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”104 Congress sometimes expressly 
preempts state law. Alternatively, courts may find that federal law on 
a subject impliedly preempts state law, either because Congress has 
entirely occupied a field or in the event of a conflict between federal 
and state law; the latter category of implied preemption may arise 
either by virtue of an impossibility of dual compliance or insofar as 
state law would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
purposes underlying federal law.105 
The U.S. Supreme Court has offered important guidance about 
the application of implied preemption principles in its latest decision 
involving tort claims brought against drug manufacturers. In Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,106 the plaintiff suffered a devastating 
injury after using sulindac, a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug 
(NSAID).107 The product that she had ingested came from a generic 
rather than a brand-name drug manufacturer, and the Supreme Court 
previously had recognized an implied preemption defense to 
inadequate warning claims against such defendants because, unlike 
brand-name companies, generic sellers lacked the power to revise 
                                                     
 103. See supra notes 28-44, 53-57 and accompanying text. 
 104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 105. See Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims 
as the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 907 (1996). 
For more recent discussions of this increasingly convoluted subject, which include 
references to the latest case law and commentary, see Gregory M. Dickinson, An 
Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme Court, 89 NEB. L. REV. 682 
(2011); Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2013); 
and David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 267, 274-82 (2015). 
 106. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 107. See id. at 2471-72. The FDA had approved Clinoril® (sulindac) in 1978, 
more than a quarter of a century before Ms. Bartlett ingested a generic version. See 
id. at 2471. Just one year after the plaintiff suffered her injury, the agency decided to 
strengthen information in the product’s labeling about the possibility of serious skin 
reactions. See id. at 2472. Thus, although a substantial amount of time had elapsed 
since original approval (during which time more risk information came to light and 
newer substitutes became available), shortly before this case went to trial the FDA 
had expressed its continued endorsement of the drug’s relative safety and efficacy. 
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their FDA-approved labeling unilaterally.108 In Bartlett, the plaintiff 
had asserted both failure-to-warn and design defect claims; the 
federal district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on 
the former theory, however, because the plaintiff’s physician 
admitted that he had not consulted the product’s labeling.109 The jury 
returned a sizeable verdict on the design defect claim, but, in the end, 
a bare majority of the Supreme Court found this theory preempted as 
well.110 
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito concluded that the 
plaintiff’s design defect claim represented nothing more than a 
preempted failure-to-warn claim in disguise.111 He reasoned that the 
seller of an FDA-approved drug enjoyed no flexibility to modify the 
composition of the product without seeking a new license from the 
agency.112 According to the majority, this meant that the plaintiff’s 
design defect claim amounted instead to an objection to the product’s 
labeling, and, because it sold a generic rather than brand-name 
                                                     
 108. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574-82 (2011). I do not 
believe that this parsing of the relevant labeling regulations genuinely distinguishes 
the case from Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). See NOAH, supra note 4, at 557 
(“The four dissenters pointed out that the same contingency had existed in Levine 
(insofar as the CBE regulation allowed innovator companies to make unilateral 
revisions to risk labeling only during an interim period before the FDA decided 
whether or not to allow it) without the Court in that case finding any conflict 
between federal and state law.”); id. (“Notwithstanding the Court’s effort to 
distinguish Levine, does the similarity between the two cases noted by the dissenters 
mean that a bare majority of the justices (three of whom had, after all, dissented in 
Levine) already doubts the continuing viability of Levine’s holding?”). For a 
sampling of the generally negative scholarly reception that Mensing has received, 
see Stacey B. Lee, PLIVA v. Mensing: Generic Consumers’ Unfortunate Hand, 12 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 209, 235-45 (2012); Daniel Kazhdan, Note, 
Wyeth and PLIVA: The Law of Inadequate Drug Labeling, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
893, 901-07, 913-26 (2012); and Fabian Nehrbass, Comment, Save Now, Pay Later: 
The Unfortunate Reality of PLIVA v. Mensing, 73 LA. L. REV. 1155, 1166-82 
(2013). 
 109. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472. 
 110. See id. at 2472, 2480. 
 111. See id. at 2470, 2475-76; id. at 2474 (“Since Mutual did not have the 
option of changing sulindac’s design, New Hampshire law ultimately required it to 
change sulindac’s labeling.”). 
 112. See id. at 2475 (“[W]ere Mutual to change the composition of its 
sulindac, the altered chemical would be a new drug that would require its own NDA 
to be marketed in interstate commerce. . . . [B]ecause of sulindac’s simple 
composition, the drug is chemically incapable of being redesigned.”). 
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product, the defendant would violate federal law if it strengthened 
the warnings without first securing FDA approval.113 
Justice Alito did not, however, view state tort law as impliedly 
preempted because it would stand as an obstacle to—or otherwise 
frustrate the purposes underlying—federal law; instead, he thought 
that the defendant would have found it impossible to comply with 
both federal and state law.114 Plaintiff had argued that the defendant 
could have declined to market its FDA-approved version, but the 
majority regarded this option as plainly preempted.115 Plaintiff also 
had argued that the defendant could have continued marketing the 
drug with the understanding that it might have to pay damages for 
any injuries that resulted, but again the majority saw such an 
obligation as impermissibly flying in the face of FDA approval.116 
                                                     
 113. See id. at 2479-80; id. at 2476 (“[F]ederal law prohibited Mutual from 
taking the remedial action required to avoid liability under New Hampshire law.”); 
id. at 2479 (“[S]tate-law design-defect claims like New Hampshire’s that place a 
duty on manufacturers to render a drug safer by either altering its composition or 
altering its labeling are in conflict with federal laws that prohibit manufacturers from 
unilaterally altering drug composition or labeling.”); id. (arguing that “the dissent is 
reduced to fighting a rearguard action against [PLIVA v. Mensing’s] reasoning”). 
 114. Indeed, the majority had not even mentioned obstacle preemption in its 
summary of basic preemption doctrine. See id. at 2473; see also Meltzer, supra note 
105, at 4-6 & n.28 (making the same observation about the plurality opinion in 
Mensing, and suggesting that they had taken a cue from Justice Thomas’ 
concurrence in Levine). In previously elaborating on his objections to obstacle 
preemption, see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 594-604 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment), Justice Thomas noted a preference for a somewhat 
broader inquiry into whether a “direct conflict” existed than suggested by the 
“physical impossibility” test, see id. at 589-90 (“For example, if federal law gives an 
individual the right to engage in certain behavior that state law prohibits, the laws 
would give contradictory commands notwithstanding the fact that an individual 
could comply with both by electing to refrain from the covered behavior.”). 
 115. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477 (“We reject this ‘stop-selling’ rationale 
as incompatible with our pre-emption jurisprudence. Our pre-emption cases presume 
that an actor seeking to satisfy both his federal- and state-law obligations is not 
required to cease acting altogether in order to avoid liability.”); id. (“The 
incoherence of the stop-selling theory becomes plain when viewed through the lens 
of our previous cases. In every instance in which the Court has found impossibility 
pre-emption, the ‘direct conflict’ between federal- and state-law duties could easily 
have been avoided if the regulated actor had simply ceased acting.”); id. at 2470 
(“[A]dopting the . . . stop-selling rationale would render impossibility pre-emption a 
dead letter and work a revolution in this Court’s pre-emption case law.”); id. at 2478 
(It would mean that “the vast majority—if not all—of the cases in which the Court 
has found impossibility pre-emption, were wrongly decided.”). 
 116. See id. at 2477 n.3 (noting that PLIVA v. Mensing “forecloses any 
argument that impossibility is defeated by the prospect that a manufacturer could 
‘pa[y] the state penalty’ for violating a state-law duty”); see also id. at 2479 (“[T]he 
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The majority left open the possibility that a plaintiff could assert a 
“parallel” claim in the event that significant new risk information 
“not before the FDA” triggered an obligation under the FDCA to 
unilaterally withdraw a still approved product.117 
At the outset of his dissent, Justice Breyer explained as 
follows:  
It is not literally impossible here for a company . . . to comply with 
conflicting state and federal law. A company can comply with both either 
by not doing business in the relevant State or by paying the state penalty, 
say damages, for failing to comply with, as here, a state-law tort 
standard.118  
Nonetheless, Breyer conceded that obstacle preemption might come 
into play in such circumstances,119 and he imagined that “the more 
medically valuable the drug, the less likely Congress intended to 
permit a State to drive it from the marketplace,”120 but he concluded 
that the parties had made no such showing.121 The government had 
filed an amicus brief arguing in favor of implied preemption in this 
case; for a variety of reasons, however, Breyer declined to defer to 
the agency’s apparently inconsistent litigating positions, though 
immediately thereafter (and without any hint of irony) he quoted 
with approval from an amicus brief filed on behalf of two former 
FDA commissioners.122 
                                                                                                                
distinction between common law and statutory law is irrelevant to the argument at 
hand: In violating a common-law duty, as surely as by violating a statutory duty, a 
party contravenes the law.”); id. at 2474 n.1 (“[M]ost common-law causes of action 
for negligence and strict liability do not exist merely to spread risk, but rather 
impose affirmative duties.”); Steven A. Schwartz, Note, “A Distinction Without a 
Difference”?: Bartlett Going Forward, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 325, 347-66 (2015) 
(discussing disagreement among lower courts on the question of whether different 
tests of design defect under state law might alter the preemption analysis, and 
concluding that it should have no impact). 
 117. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477 n.4. 
 118. Id. at 2480-81 (Breyer, J., joined by Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 119. See id. at 2481 (“[S]tate law that requires a company to withdraw from 
the State or pay a sizable damages remedy in order to avoid the conflict between 
state and federal law may nonetheless stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of the federal law’s objective, in which case the relevant state law is pre-empted.”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 2482 (“I have found no convincing reason to believe that 
removing this particular drug from New Hampshire’s market, or requiring damage 
payments for it there, would be so harmful that it would seriously undercut the 
purposes of the federal statutory scheme.”). 
 122. See id. at 2481-82. At no point, however, did the majority make 
reference to the government’s brief. 
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In a far lengthier dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor 
elaborated on many of the same points made by Justice Breyer.123 
She emphasized that the receipt of a federal license to market a 
product did not itself require any particular conduct by the license-
holder that might conflict with state law; indeed, sellers of FDA-
approved drugs occasionally withdraw them from the marketplace 
unilaterally (and a separate provision of the FDCA may obligate 
them to do just that),124 so design defect claims that might create 
added incentives to take precisely such a step would in no sense 
conflict with federal law: “Impossibility does not exist where the 
laws of one sovereign permit an activity that the laws of the other 
sovereign restricts or even prohibits.”125 
Approved NDAs represent more than simply federal 
permission to market a pharmaceutical product, however; they 
amount to licenses, which qualify as a form of intangible property 
entitled to constitutional recognition.126 Indeed, one of the Supreme 
Court’s very first conflict preemption decisions involved a federal 
shipping permit that the State of New York inappropriately had 
declined to recognize in issuing a steamboat monopoly to someone 
else.127 For similar reasons, a state could not decline to recognize a 
                                                     
 123. See id. at 2482 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 124. See id. at 2491-92 & n.9; id. at 2484 (“[T]he FDA’s permission to 
market a drug has never been regarded as a final stamp of approval of the drug’s 
safety.”). 
 125. Id. at 2486; see also id. (“[I]f federal law permitted (but did not require) 
a labeling practice that state law prohibited, there would be no irreconcilable 
conflict; a manufacturer could comply with the more stringent regulation.”); id. at 
2492 (“New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action thus does no more than 
provide an impetus for an action that is permitted and sometimes encouraged or 
even required by federal law.”); id. (“Congressional intent to pre-empt . . . cannot be 
gleaned from the existence of federal specifications that apply to the product if it is 
sold.”). 
 126. See Noah, supra note 1, at 594-99 (evaluating procedural due process 
and regulatory takings objections to proposed federal efforts to revoke or limit the 
scope of an approved NDA); Noah, supra note 41, at 385-91 (same). The FDA 
occasionally permits the sale of pharmaceutical products without issuing a license, 
see id. at 368, 370 (discussing the monograph system used for many nonprescription 
drugs), which seemingly would make an implied preemption argument against state 
prohibitions on the sale of such drugs more difficult, but an express preemption 
clause sometimes applies in this situation, see id. at 382 & n.122. 
 127. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211-12, 221, 240 (1824); 
id. at 210 (framing the question as “whether the laws of New-York . . . have, in their 
application to this case, come into collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a 
citizen of a right to which that act entitles him”); see also Joseph F. Petros III, Note, 
The Other War on Drugs: Federal Preemption, the FDA, and Prescription Drugs 
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controversial patent issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
on the ground that it viewed the subject matter as inappropriate for 
protection as intellectual property.128 
Justice Sotomayor also argued that New Hampshire’s 
recognition of design defect claims did not dictate any particular 
change in the conduct of defendants,129 and the opportunity to either 
pay compensatory damages or exit the market would defeat any 
claim of impossibility.130 Although conceding that obstacle 
preemption nonetheless might exist even in such circumstances,131 
she doubted that it would ever frustrate federal purposes to allow tort 
                                                                                                                
After Wyeth v. Levine, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 637, 648-49 
(2011) (“The similarities between Gibbons and the modern question of FDA 
preemption for prescription drugs are striking. . . . [They both] involve some sort of 
‘license’ granted by the federal government to carry on in a venue of interstate 
commerce.”). See generally Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398 
(2004) (offering a thorough account of this litigation, and explaining at length why 
Chief Justice Marshall opted for a contrived reading of the Federal Navigation Act 
of 1793 as preempting the monopoly granted by New York rather than resting the 
decision on his detailed exposition of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). 
 128. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that “a state court is without power to invalidate an issued 
patent”); Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in 
Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 487, 535-36 (2013) (“Once a U.S. patent is issued to 
an inventor pursuant to the Patent Act, states are generally bound by the Supremacy 
Clause to respect and uphold that right.”); see also Adam Mossoff, Patents as 
Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the 
Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 700-14 (2007); cf. Biotech. Indus. Org. v. 
District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Patent 
Act impliedly preempted a local drug price control law). But cf. Biotech. Indus. Org. 
v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[P]atent law does not preempt or conflict with 
state and federal statutes regulating or prohibiting the sale of patented products.”); 
NOAH, supra note 4, at 877 (“What if D.C. officials regarded the sale of an FDA-
approved product as posing a serious danger to the public health—could they ban its 
local sale, notwithstanding the resulting interference with the patent-holder’s ability 
to generate a profit?”). 
 129. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2486-91 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 
2488 (“New Hampshire law imposed no duty on Mutual to change sulindac’s 
chemical composition.”); id. at 2489 (“[Its] design-defect law did not require Mutual 
to do anything other than to compensate consumers who were injured by an 
unreasonably dangerous drug.”). 
 130. See id. at 2491 (“[T]he manufacturer may still choose between exiting 
the market or continuing to sell while knowing it may have to pay compensation to 
consumers injured by its product.”). 
 131. See id. at 2492-93; see also id. at 2486 (“Courts may find that state laws 
that incentivize what federal law discourages or forbid what federal law authorizes 
are pre-empted for reasons apart from impossibility . . . .”). 
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claims against the sellers of FDA-approved drugs.132 Sotomayor 
accused the majority of relying on “an implicit and undefended 
assumption that federal law gives pharmaceutical companies a right 
to sell a federally approved drug free from common-law liability,”133 
and she cited the government’s amicus brief as conceding “the 
absence of textual support in the FDCA for the idea that an approved 
drug must be made available in any particular State.”134 In the end, of 
course, the dissenters’ various arguments lost out in this case. 
Whatever one may think about its implied preemption analysis 
on the failure-to-warn claim (or whether sellers can warn their way 
out of duties to redesign products under the risk-utility test), the 
majority’s treatment of the plaintiff’s design defect claim portends 
far broader consequences. First, it seemingly would apply with equal 
force to sellers of brand-name drug products,135 thereby putting an 
end to peculiar decisions such as Tobin.136 Second, entirely beyond 
tort litigation, the majority’s analysis suggests that FDA drug 
approval would impliedly preempt state positive law as well.137 For 
                                                     
 132. See id. at 2493-94. 
 133. Id. at 2483; see also id. at 2490 (“Though the majority insists otherwise, 
. . . it appears to rely principally on an implicit assumption about rights conferred by 
federal premarket approval under the FDCA.”); id. at 2491 (“Because the majority 
does not rely on obstacle pre-emption, it must believe that a manufacturer that 
received FDA premarket approval has a right . . . to keep its drug on the market 
unless and until the FDA revokes approval . . . .”). 
 134. Id. at 2494. 
 135. See id. at 2471 (majority opinion) (“Once a drug—whether generic or 
brandname—is approved, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any major 
changes to the ‘qualitative or quantitative formulation of the drug product, including 
active ingredients, or in the specifications provided in the approved application.’ 21 
C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(i).”); id. at 2494-95 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[P]remarket 
review, by definition, prevents manufacturers from unilaterally changing their 
products’ designs. That is true, for example, of the designs (i.e., the chemical 
composition) of brand-name drugs under the FDCA no less than it is for generic 
drugs.” (footnote omitted)); see also Noah, supra note 93, at 861-63 (explaining that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers cannot readily modify the designs of their products). 
 136. Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 537-40 (6th Cir. 
1993) (sustaining a judgment for the plaintiff premised on the claim that a defect 
existed in the design of ritodrine from the moment that the FDA approved this drug); 
see also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing this decision). 
 137. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2478 n.5 (suggesting that the imposition of 
tort liability is akin to a state “directly prohibiting the product’s sale”); id. at 2479 
(“[S]tatutory ‘mandate[s]’ do precisely the same thing [as the threat of adverse tort 
judgments]: They require a manufacturer to choose between leaving the market and 
accepting the consequences of its actions (in the form of a fine or other sanction).”). 
Then again, to the extent that such decisions reflect the conservative wing’s hostility 
toward tort law, perhaps those Justices would express greater sympathy for states’ 
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some reason, however, Judge Zobel had not cited Bartlett to buttress 
her sense that federal law preempted Massachusetts’s effort to ban 
Zohydro, perhaps because she thought that the case before her raised 
questions of implied preemption based solely on frustration of 
purposes rather than impossibility of dual compliance.138 Even so, if 
the relatively more attenuated command of design defect scrutiny in 
tort law created an actual conflict with federal law governing FDA-
approved drugs, then surely an outright sales prohibition imposed by 
state officials would do so. 
B. Dormant Commerce Clause 
The U.S. Constitution has no “dormant commerce clause” as 
such. Instead, this judicially crafted doctrine springs by negative 
implication from the power of Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”139 The doctrine 
bears some similarity to preemption, with Article I’s enumeration of 
the power to regulate interstate commerce itself arguably triggering 
the Supremacy Clause even if Congress has not yet acted pursuant to 
that authority or has done so in a way that does not have preemptive 
effect.140 In recent years, however, the dormant Commerce Clause 
                                                                                                                
rights when positive law comes into conflict with FDA approval. Conversely, the 
four members of the Court’s liberal wing seemed somewhat more open to the idea 
that state positive law might trigger impossibility preemption. See, e.g., id. at 2485 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (hypothesizing a conflict related to ingredient disclosure 
requirements even though a company could comply with both federal and state law 
by not selling in the state with the more restrictive approach); id. at 2488 
(contrasting the threat of liability with “a legal mandate . . . to take (or refrain from 
taking) a specific action”); id. at 2491 n.8 (same). The Court unanimously found 
obstacle preemption in several comparable earlier cases. See supra note 44. 
 138. Instead, she distinguished Wyeth v. Levine, which the Commonwealth 
had relied upon. See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 
1454696, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014) (“Wyeth is a drug labeling [tort] case, and 
defendants present no evidence or persuasive argument that its reasoning should 
control in this different context.”). 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Brannon P. Denning, 
Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
417 (2008); Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The 
Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877 
(2011). 
 140. Cf. Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 497, 561-65 (2012) 
(drawing comparisons to preemption doctrine); id. at 501 (“Dormancy holdings 
mean that state power to take the action is constitutionally precluded ex ante, while 
preemption holdings mean that action otherwise within states’ constitutional power 
is contingently unconstitutional because of a conflict with federal law.”). 
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doctrine has played a somewhat more limited role in displacing state 
authority than has preemption. 
During the mid-twentieth century, Supreme Court decisions in 
this area spoke of ensuring the free flow of trade throughout the 
country.141 Nowadays, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
consists of a pair of inquiries. First, does a state or local law 
expressly discriminate against foreign businesses? If out-of-state 
commercial actors face greater barriers than comparable entities 
situated within the state, then a court will subject the law to 
heightened scrutiny.142 Only rarely will a facially discriminatory law 
survive such scrutiny.143 Second, assuming that the challenged law 
draws no distinction between local and out-of-state businesses, does 
it nonetheless unduly interfere with interstate commerce? If a state 
burdens commercial activity with entities in other states, then a court 
will subject the law to a milder form of scrutiny, asking whether the 
particular local purpose served by the restriction outweighs its 
                                                     
 141. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) 
(“Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every 
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free 
access to every market in the Nation . . . .”); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 
327, 330 (1944) (“The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area 
of free trade among the several States.”); Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 
511, 527 (1935) (“[T]he police power may [not] be used by the state of destination 
with the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition with 
the products of another state . . . .”); see also Norman R. Williams, The Foundations 
of the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 409, 423-37, 447-51 
(2008). 
 142. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472-76, 489-93 (2005) 
(invalidating Michigan and New York laws that made it hard or impossible for out-
of-state wineries to ship directly to customers); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 
U.S. 278, 307 n.15 (1997) (“[I]f a State discriminates against out-of-state interests 
by drawing geographical distinctions between entities that are otherwise similarly 
situated, such facial discrimination will be subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny 
even if it is directed toward a legitimate health and safety goal.”); Or. Waste Sys., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (“As we use the term here, 
‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a restriction on 
commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.”). 
 143. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 
564, 582 (1997) (noting that such scrutiny “is an extremely difficult burden, so 
heavy that facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect”). For a rare 
exception, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148-52 (1986) (sustaining a state’s 
prohibition on the importation of live baitfish because it represented the only way of 
protecting local waters and fish populations from the threat posed by invasive 
species and parasites). 
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adverse impacts on foreign businesses.144 Although this basic 
framework has become relatively well established over the last half 
century, the doctrine routinely gets criticized for its fluid and 
unpredictable application.145 
The pharmaceutical industry has tried on more than one 
occasion to use the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to fend off 
local regulation.146 In 2003, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected 
                                                     
 144. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the 
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and 
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.” (emphasis added)); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-73 (1981) (upholding a state ban on the sale of milk in 
nonreturnable plastic containers because it imposed a “relatively minor” burden on 
interstate commerce, insofar as it continued to allow for the free flow of milk 
products and cartons across the state’s borders, but produced substantial benefits in 
terms of “promoting conservation of energy and other natural resources and easing 
solid waste disposal problems”); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 
429, 441-48 (1978) (invalidating under this test Wisconsin restrictions on the length 
of trucks). Thus, unlike obstacle preemption, with its focus on federal purposes, 
balancing under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine inquires about state 
purposes and their weightiness. 
 145. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 360 (2008) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) (calling on the Court to “abandon the Pike-balancing 
enterprise altogether and leave these quintessentially legislative judgments with the 
branch to which the Constitution assigns them”); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“[T]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the 
Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application, 
. . . and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state statute.”); W. 
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (referring to it as a “‘quagmire’”); id. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (complaining of a “messianic insistence on a grim sink-or-swim policy 
of laissez-faire economics . . . under the dormant Commerce Clause, a policy which 
bodes ill for the values of federalism which have long animated our constitutional 
jurisprudence”); Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much—An 
Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 48-64, 
85-87 (1981). 
 146. The industry’s trade association, the awkwardly named Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), brought several of these 
lawsuits. See, e.g., PhRMA v. Cty. of Alameda, 768 F.3d 1037, 1041-46 (9th Cir. 
2014) (rejecting constitutional challenge to an ordinance that required companies 
selling pharmaceuticals in the county to establish drug take-back programs for the 
purpose of guarding against improper consumer disposal of products potentially 
harmful to the environment or subject to abuse); PhRMA v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 
817, 827 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting objection to a special rebate requirement 
adopted in Michigan); see also Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 
311-13 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge to a Maine law that imposed special 
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such an effort, upholding the State of Maine’s program that 
threatened to offer less favorable Medicaid coverage for drugs unless 
companies also granted rebates on those products when used by 
uninsured patients not eligible for Medicaid.147 The industry had 
argued, for instance, that the law impermissibly impacted company 
pricing decisions in other states, but the Court found nothing 
problematic about such an alleged extraterritorial effect.148 Efforts to 
control drug prices through state payment decisions differ, of course, 
from laws that bar pharmaceutical products at the border and prevent 
patients with private insurance coverage (or personal means) from 
making use of them. 
Even state laws that do not discriminate on their face may 
founder if the balancing inquiry reveals that a restriction serves no 
purpose other than to protect local businesses.149 In this vein, one 
should note that state prohibitions on the sale of pharmaceuticals—
products that typically originate outside of a state—sometimes will 
work to the benefit of local suppliers of competing services.150 Thus, 
if a powerful new drug threatened established providers (e.g., 
surgeons or hospitals) of nonpharmaceutical treatments for the same 
                                                                                                                
duties of disclosure on pharmacy benefit managers in their dealings with health 
insurers). 
 147. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003); see also id. at 684 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In a far more fractured 
aspect of the case, the Court also rejected an implied preemption challenge. See id. 
at 662-68 (plurality opinion); id. at 670 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 674 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 
675 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 148. See id. at 669-70 (majority opinion); see also Brannon P. Denning, 
Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 
73 LA. L. REV. 979, 990-92 (2013) (arguing that PhRMA v. Walsh marked the 
Court’s abandonment of a freestanding rule against extraterritorial regulation under 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); Peter Felmly, Comment, Beyond the 
Reach of the States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State 
Legislation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 483-514 (2003) 
(arguing that courts should keep the extraterritoriality principle distinct). 
 149. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-54 
(1977). 
 150. Cf. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997) (“[A]ny 
notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities.” 
(footnote omitted)); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473-74 
(1981) (“A nondiscriminatory regulation serving substantial state purposes is not 
invalid simply because it causes some business to shift from a predominantly out-of-
state industry [i.e., plastic resins used to make nonreturnable milk jugs] to a 
predominantly in-state industry [i.e., pulpwood used to make paperboard milk 
cartons].”). 
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disease or condition, then a state prohibition might violate the 
doctrine’s antiprotectionism principle. For instance, psychologists 
might fear losing business after the introduction of a remarkably 
effective new antidepressant,151 even if psychiatrists would relish the 
prospect; cosmetic surgeons might worry that they would get fewer 
customers if physicians could prescribe an amazing new wrinkle-
reducer;152 or any gynecologists who make a living from performing 
abortions might regard FDA approval of abortifacient drugs as 
siphoning away potential patients. Even if these illustrations seem 
far-fetched as likely grounds for a state ban on a particular drug, they 
do point up the fact that some (invariably local) health professionals 
may stand to benefit from such a prohibition and their advocacy of 
such action might disclose a protectionist purpose should lawmakers 
concur. 
How would Massachusetts’s effort to ban Zohydro fare under 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine? As noted previously, Judge 
Zobel had declined to reach this question,153 and it seemed at least 
slightly misplaced in that case because, as it turned out, the financial 
consequences of the Commonwealth’s prohibition would have fallen 
most heavily on an in-state company.154 On its face, the emergency 
                                                     
 151. This may help to explain why psychologists in some states have sought 
limited prescribing privileges. See Brent Pollitt, Fool’s Gold: Psychologists Using 
Disingenuous Reasoning to Mislead Legislatures into Granting Psychologists 
Prescriptive Authority, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 489, 512 (2003) (“Psychologists seeking 
prescriptive authority appear blinded by their own self-interest associated with 
prescribing medication . . . .”); id. at 521 (“[T]he psychologists seeking prescriptive 
authority view the situation as a ‘turf’ war . . . . They recognize that psychopharma-
ceutical treatment continues to gain in popularity with insurance companies and 
patients, and they want to ensure their place in the future of mental health 
treatment.”); James E. Long, Jr., Note, Power to Prescribe: The Debate over 
Prescription Privileges for Psychologists and the Legal Issues Implicated, 29 LAW 
& PSYCHOL. REV. 243, 250 & n.54 (2005); id. at 244-56 (discussing new laws in 
Louisiana and New Mexico). 
 152. See James F. Peltz, Botox Maker Adds Wrinkle to Lineup; Allergan 
Agrees to Buy Kythera, Developer of Kybella, Which Treats Double Chins, L.A. 
TIMES, June 18, 2015, at C1 (reporting that Botox generates revenues of more than 
$2 billion annually, adding that the FDA recently approved an injectable drug to 
eliminate submental fat). 
 153. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Yvonne Abraham, Fighting, Then Fueling, Drug Abuse, BOS. 
GLOBE, Apr. 10, 2014, at A1 (“Out front in all of this controversy has been a 
company called Zogenix, out of San Diego. But Zogenix has only a license to 
market the drug. The actual outfit behind Zohydro is a Waltham company named 
Alkermes . . . . Zogenix markets the drug and takes heat from critics, but Alkermes 
owns Zohydro, manufactures it, and stands to make mountains of money from it.”); 
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regulation applied to all extended-release pure hydrocodone products 
that lacked abuse-resistant features, whether sold by a local or 
foreign manufacturer, though Zogenix objected that (at least initially) 
only Zohydro fell into this narrowly defined class.155 Nothing 
suggested that this public health regulation served merely as pretext 
to favor local interests. 
Under the balancing test utilized for restrictions that have only 
an incidental effect on interstate commerce, the interest asserted by 
Massachusetts would, however, confront the conflicting judgment of 
federal regulatory officials. True, particular states may experience 
higher-than-average problems with the misuse of prescription 
drugs,156 and the FDA’s licensing decisions may focus too narrowly 
on just the risks and benefits to patients while failing to fully 
consider societal consequences, but the DEA’s scheduling choices 
presumably would have taken that broader view.157 On the other side 
of the ledger, the FDA’s approval decision suggests that depriving 
                                                                                                                
Barry Meier, Addiction Specialists Wary of New Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
2013, at B3. In contrast, imagine that Connecticut, home of the companies’ chief 
rival Purdue, had taken a similar step. 
 155. Similarly, although the regulation clearly sought to encourage Zogenix 
to seek FDA approval for a reformulated product that incorporated abuse-resistant 
features, it did not appear to operate in an impermissibly extraterritorial fashion. Cf. 
Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 
and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1899-900 (1987) (explaining that, although Michigan would 
have the power to prohibit smoking within the state notwithstanding adverse effects 
on an out-of-state industry, it could not prohibit cigarette manufacturing in North 
Carolina in an effort to guard against blackmarket sales). 
 156. See Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: Variation Among States in 
Prescribing of Opioid Pain Relievers and Benzodiazepines—United States, 2012, 63 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 563, 564 (2014); cf. Darlena Cunha, Chronic 
Pain Meets Worries About Opioid Addiction, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2016, at E1 (“The 
United States uses 80 percent of the world’s opioids, . . . yet it makes up less than 5 
percent of the world’s population.”). Apart from undoubted demographic variations, 
states may take different approaches to law enforcement, supervision of physicians, 
and treatment of addiction. 
 157. See supra note 35. Strangely enough, in objecting to the FDA’s 
approval of rbST, which promised to increase milk production in dairy cows, some 
critics evidently worried about human misuse of this non-scheduled drug. See Burk, 
supra note 77, at 290 (“[P]ossible substance abuse of rbST by bodybuilders and 
athletes has been cited as a concern. . . . A legislative ban on rbST itself might be 
rationally related to such a concern, provided once again that some evidence can be 
produced of the likelihood of abuse.”). 
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legitimate patients of access would represent something of a hardship 
to them.158 
Courts have offered little guidance on how to value the adverse 
consequences of a state effort to restrict commerce.159 In one recent 
decision, a federal appellate court sustained a county ordinance that 
obligated pharmaceutical manufacturers to establish a program to 
take back and safely dispose of unused drugs. In rejecting the 
industry’s dormant Commerce Clause challenge, the court 
emphasized the relatively trivial financial burden imposed by such a 
requirement: At most, it would cost little more than 0.1% of the 
revenues generated by those companies in that county.160 A sales 
prohibition would, of course, represent a far more onerous 
restriction: The manufacturer(s) of a banned drug would face what 
amounts to a 100% tax in that jurisdiction.161 Even if viewed from the 
                                                     
 158. Cf. Noah, supra note 93, at 855 (warning of “the twin dangers of tunnel-
vision (risk-utility judged solely from a [tort] plaintiff’s perspective) and preference 
aggregation (risk-utility evaluated from a societal perspective), both of which might 
unduly sacrifice the needs of a minority of patients for whom the risk-utility balance 
differs from either the particular victim or the norm” (footnote omitted)); id. at 872-
73 (illustrating with the infamous teratogen thalidomide). 
 159. Cf. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353-55 (2008); 
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 346-48 (1977) (rejecting 
the petitioner’s objection that the respondent had failed to demonstrate that any of its 
members satisfied the $10,000 amount-in-controversy prerequisite for exercising 
jurisdiction); id. at 347 (“[The] object [of this litigation] is the right of the individual 
Washington apple growers and dealers to conduct their business affairs in the North 
Carolina market free from the interference of the challenged statute. The value of 
that right is measured by the losses that will follow from the statute’s 
enforcement.”); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1970) 
(concluding that the $200,000 it would cost one grower to construct a new packing 
facility was a burden that outweighed the state’s asserted interest in protecting the 
reputation of Arizona producers).  
 160. See PhRMA v. Cty. of Alameda, 768 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“The county compares the cost of running the disposal program ($530,000–
$1,200,000 per year) to the manufacturers’ revenue-stream in Alameda County 
(approximately $950 million per year) to conclude that the burden is minimal.”); cf. 
Noah, supra note 41, at 389-90 & n.155 (explaining that projected health system 
savings from prematurely switching prescription drugs to OTC status would 
translate into hundreds of millions of dollars in financial losses suffered by the 
manufacturers of those products). 
 161. Cf. Dean Foods Co. v. Wis. Dep’t Agric., 478 F. Supp. 224, 231-32 
(W.D. Wis. 1979) (calling a statute that appeared to prohibit the sale of an imitation 
chocolate milk product “the most burdensome, gross, and radical of the alternative 
means available,” and granting a preliminary injunction on dormant Commerce 
Clause grounds), after reargument, 504 F. Supp. 520, 528-29 (W.D. Wis. 1980) 
(conceding that this may have represented a misinterpretation of the statute as 
applied to the plaintiff’s product); Maltz, supra note 145, at 77 (“The hypothetical 
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perspective of aggregate sales around the country, a prohibition in 
one state would entail an average loss of 2% of projected revenue,162 
which for a “blockbuster” drug (defined as a product generating sales 
exceeding $1 billion annually163) would come to over $20 million 
each year; to a giant pharmaceutical manufacturer such as Pfizer,164 
such a loss might amount to little more than petty cash, but smaller 
companies with only a handful of products could not so easily shrug 
it off. Like the vast majority of FDA-approved drugs, Zohydro 
would not have reached blockbuster status, but it represented the 
only product in the portfolio of Zogenix. 
C. Substantive Due Process 
In its Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Constitution includes 
the following language:  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.165  
Like the parallel clause demanding that federal actors ensure due 
process, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted this 
language as offering both procedural and substantive protections.166 
                                                                                                                
contemplates the severest possible interference with a person’s right to sell goods in 
interstate commerce—a total interdiction.”). 
 162. The 2% figure reflects one state out of fifty. Although states range 
dramatically in size, Massachusetts happens to account for approximately 2% of the 
nation’s population. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2012, at 18 tbl.13, http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/ 
12statab/pop.pdf [https://perma.cc/95J6-7B8T]. 
 163. See Stacy Lawrence, Billion Dollar Babies—Biotech Drugs as 
Blockbusters, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 380, 380 (2007); Jonathan D. Rockoff, The Next 
Blockbuster: Drug Scouts Chase Hot Prospects, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2014, at A1. 
 164. See Robert Weisman, Pfizer Gets an Open Vibe; New Kendall Square 
Research Center Fosters Collaborative Approach to Drug Development, BOS. 
GLOBE, June 15, 2014, at G1 (“Part of the challenge is Pfizer’s sheer size—its 
market value exceeds $187 billion. That means the pharma giant, in order to grow, 
must constantly bring out new drugs, particularly so-called blockbusters that ring up 
annual sales of $1 billion or more . . . .”). 
 165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 166. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
(‘‘We have long recognized that the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, guarantees more than fair process. . . . 
The Clause also includes a substantive component that provides heightened 
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and 
 Federal Primacy in Licensing Pharmaceuticals 43 
If, for instance, a state actor summarily confiscated a patient’s supply 
of lawfully dispensed drug products, then notions of procedural due 
process typically would entitle that individual to an official 
explanation and some sort of hearing, among other potential 
remedies. (In addition, selective enforcement may trigger an 
affiliated objection on equal protection grounds.) Here, however, the 
question focuses on state efforts to bar (across the board) 
pharmaceutical access before dispensing, so the due process question 
would arise primarily in its substantive dimension. 
Normally, state laws challenged as violating notions of 
substantive due process enjoy a presumption of regularity and need 
only satisfy extremely deferential judicial review. So long as a 
legislative choice passes the “rational basis” test, judges must not 
superimpose their own views of sensible public policy.167 Indeed, 
courts need not even find that state actors in fact invoked plausible 
grounds for making a particular choice—it suffices that the 
legislature could have had such purposes in mind. Only if a law 
burdens some “fundamental right,” which springs from the reference 
to “life, liberty, or property” in the text (or if, under equal protection, 
it uses a “suspect classification” such as race), must courts engage in 
more searching constitutional scrutiny.168 For purposes of triggering 
heightened—whether intermediate or strict—scrutiny, courts have 
struggled in deciding what qualifies as a fundamental right.169 
                                                                                                                
liberty interests.’’); cf. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due 
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 509-12 (2010) (concluding that originalism 
would assign divergent meanings to the due process clauses in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, with only the latter having a substantive dimension). In 
any event, the focus here shifts from the rights of sellers to the rights of buyers. 
 167. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1993); Heller 
v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993). 
 168. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993); see also Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273-74, 1283-84, 
1293-94, 1298-301 (2007) (summarizing the different modern tiers of constitutional 
review and their use in early substantive due process cases); Stephen A. Siegel, The 
Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 355, 358-61 (2006) (same); id. at 393-94, 397-98, 406 (discussing the different 
functions potentially served by strict scrutiny); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and 
Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006) (finding that, in recent years, restrictions on 
fundamental rights survive 24% of the time); id. at 862-66 (elaborating). 
 169. Compare, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) 
(extending a fundamental right of marriage to same-sex couples), with id. at 2616-23 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (lambasting the majority’s due process analysis), and id. 
at 2632-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Three 
Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63 (2006); Stephen Kanter, 
44 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
In connection with therapeutic products, the Supreme Court has 
rejected the argument that physicians or patients enjoy a fundamental 
right of access to pharmaceuticals for uses not approved by the FDA. 
Although it previously had recognized that patients enjoyed a 
fundamental right to decline life-saving interventions,170 the Court 
found no affirmative right of access for those seeking physician-
assisted suicide.171 It seemed, however, that five of the Justices would 
have recognized a right to obtain medication for palliative purposes 
even if the use of such drugs might hasten death,172 which at least 
suggests the possibility of a comparable right of access for patients 
without a terminal illness if appropriate use of the drugs would not 
pose any likelihood of fatality.173 
Similarly, lower courts have rejected claims to a constitutional 
right of access to potentially life-saving drugs not (yet) approved by 
                                                                                                                
The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 623 (2006); Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: 
Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2006). 
 170. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) 
(“[F]or purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution would 
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving 
hydration and nutrition.”); id. at 287-89 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 171. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (concluding 
that the claimed right was neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition” nor “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); id. at 735 (holding that 
the state’s prohibition survived review under the rational basis test); see also Vacco 
v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800-01, 808-09 (1997) (rejecting an equal protection 
challenge to a New York statute that prohibited anyone from assisting suicide 
notwithstanding the fact that another statute had authorized competent patients to 
decline resuscitation efforts); Lars Noah, Turn the Beat Around?: Deactivating 
Implanted Cardiac-Assist Devices, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1229, 1260-67 (2013) 
(discussing these decisions in the context of patient requests to discontinue the use 
of life-sustaining medical devices). 
 172. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (suggesting that the Court might hold it unconstitutional “were state law 
to prevent the provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as 
needed to avoid pain at the end of life”); see also Robert A. Burt, The Supreme 
Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 
337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234-35 (1997); Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and 
Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 82 MINN. L. REV. 895, 908-09 
(1998). 
 173. See Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a 
Constitutional Right to Pain Relief, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 495, 528 (2003) (“While 
[Justice Breyer] does not explicitly state that barriers to adequate pain treatment in 
nonterminal patients also would potentially represent a constitutional violation, such 
a conclusion seems implicit in his reasoning.”); id. at 529 (“It seems logical to imply 
from Justice Stevens’ argument that he would support a constitutional right to pain 
treatment that does not hasten death for nonterminal pain.”). 
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the FDA,174 much less to drugs not even undergoing clinical trials in 
the hopes of eventually securing a license from the agency.175 What, 
however, about patients seeking access to a federally licensed 
pharmaceutical product for life-saving or other approved uses in a 
state that has decided to prohibit its distribution; would that not 
substantially burden patients’ rights to make sometimes profound or 
sensitive decisions about their medical care?176 Note that this does 
not amount to claiming an affirmative right of government-
subsidized availability but only demanding that state officials not 
stand in the way of a patient’s freedom—typically with a physician’s 
assent—to make use of a product that has satisfied requirements for 
federal licensure.177 
                                                     
 174. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 701, 711-13 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (focusing on 
investigational drugs that have successfully completed Phase I trials sought by 
terminally ill patients lacking other options); id. at 701 (“We do not address the 
broader question of whether access to medicine might ever implicate fundamental 
rights.”); CareToLive v. von Eschenbach, 525 F. Supp. 2d 952, 965-66 (S.D. Ohio 
2007) (rejecting constitutional objections to the FDA’s delay in approving an active 
cellular immunotherapy (Provenge®) for metastatic prostate cancer); Smith v. 
Shalala, 954 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1996) (antineoplastons for use in cancer); supra 
notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing these issues in connection with state 
“right to try” laws); see also Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some Drugs?: The 
FDA Burdens Reproductive Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 248 (2007) 
(“[C]ourts consistently ha[ve] rejected claims that persons had any special right of 
access to pharmaceutical products. Although patients enjoyed an interest in making 
choices about their medical care, the government could decline to allow the sale of 
drugs until the manufacturer proved their safety and effectiveness.”). 
 175. See Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 864-66 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(marijuana); Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(amygdalin); Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980) 
(same); Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 123 (D.D.C. 2001) (marijuana); 
Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 612-19, 622 (Wash. 1997) (same); see also supra 
notes 82-85 and accompanying text (elaborating on these issues); cf. Kulsar v. 
Ambach, 598 F. Supp. 1124, 1125-26 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting a claimed right of 
access to adrenal cortex extract, a purported treatment for hypoglycemia withdrawn 
from market by the FDA). 
 176. The Court has offered various descriptions of the requisite threshold 
before a burden suffices to trigger heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(“placing a substantial obstacle in the path” of exercising rights creates an “undue 
burden”); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992) (“severe restriction”); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978) (“significantly interfere”). 
 177. See John A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the “Culture of Life”: 
Constitutional Issues in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 
7-16; id. at 9 (“It would be surprising if state action that diminished the ability to 
stay alive did not receive the same scrutiny as infringement of the more particular 
46 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
The Supreme Court has treated choices about procreation as 
central aspects of a person’s liberty and associated rights to 
privacy.178 As noted previously, it long ago invalidated state laws 
barring the use of contraceptive products after the FDA had 
authorized their sale.179 In those cases, the Court rejected the claim 
that guarding against promiscuous behavior qualified as a 
compelling governmental interest.180 Along similar lines, its 
recognition of a fundamental right to abortion presumably would 
prevent a state from entirely barring access to mifepristone, the 
abortifacient drug that gets used exclusively before viability.181 
Conversely, medical interventions such as fertility drugs designed to 
                                                                                                                
rights which being alive makes possible.”); id. at 10 (“[T]he right to use safe and 
effective medical treatments could also be grounded in liberty rights to be free of 
pain or disability.”); id. at 17-18 (conceding that the FDA could act to ensure the 
safety and effectiveness of therapies derived from embryonic stem cells (ESCs)); id. 
at 31 (concluding that “the state could not ban safe and effective [i.e., FDA 
approved] ESC treatments”).  
 178. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-66, 573-74 (2003); 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (“A woman’s decision to conceive 
or to bear a child is a component of her liberty that is protected by the Due Process 
Clause . . . .”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (“The 
decision whether or not to beget or bear a child . . . holds a particularly important 
place in the history of the right of privacy . . . . [D]ecisions whether to accomplish or 
to prevent conception are among the most private and sensitive.”). 
 179. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); see 
also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779-80 (2014) (citing 
Griswold for the proposition that, “[u]nder our cases, women (and men) have a 
constitutional right to obtain contraceptives”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (reading 
Griswold and its progeny as protecting “the decision to use contraception”); supra 
notes 60-61 and accompanying text (elaborating); cf. Heinzerling, supra note 64, at 
965 & n.271 (asserting incorrectly that “contraception is the only category of drug 
product regulated by the FDA that has constitutional stature,” citing as support for 
the negative part of her claim only the unsuccessful litigation that asserted a right of 
access to investigational drugs).  
 180. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 694-96 (plurality opinion); Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 505-06 (White, J., concurring in 
judgment). This has not kept good Catholics from continuing to try and justify such 
prohibitions. See, e.g., Patrick A. Shrake, Comment, Griswold at 40: The State’s 
Compelling Interest in Banning Contraceptives, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 475, 485-507 
(2005) (arguing that products designed to impair fertility induce (by definition) an 
unhealthy condition, non-barrier contraceptives carry the risk of serious side effects, 
and all contraceptives facilitate promiscuous behavior, which purportedly threatens 
the institution of marriage, increases divorce rates, and promotes the spread of 
sexually transmitted diseases). 
 181. See Noah, supra note 1, at 602-03; see also supra note 69 and 
accompanying text (revealing that the lower courts presently are divided over lesser 
state restrictions on the use of mifepristone). 
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facilitate childbearing also seemingly would enjoy some 
constitutional protection.182 
Outside of the realm of procreative rights, however, guidance 
becomes harder to find. For instance, could state lawmakers ban a 
pharmaceutical product known to cause serious birth defects because 
they feared that its accidental use during pregnancy would 
necessitate abortions?183 What about drugs other than contraceptives 
that some worry may promote undesirable behaviors, such as 
pharmaceutical products that guard against the consequences of 
certain sexually transmitted diseases (STDs)? Surely no one would 
consider banning HIV treatments on this ground,184 but what if a state 
such as Kansas decided to prohibit the use of Gardasil®—a vaccine 
approved by the FDA to prevent the STD human papillomavirus 
(HPV), which sometimes causes cervical cancer—out of fears that it 
might promote sexual promiscuity among teenagers?185 As suggested 
                                                     
 182. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of 
Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 659-65 (2003) (discussing 
scholarly debates about the right to make use of fertility treatments); cf. id. at 664 
(“[C]onstitutional regard for procreative liberties should not stand as an obstacle to 
the withdrawal of fertility drugs if the FDA decides that they no longer represent 
safe and effective products, just as it would not prevent the agency from denying a 
marketing application for a new fertility drug that failed to satisfy normal criteria for 
approval.”). 
 183. Cf. Noah, supra note 174, at 250-52 (discussing the possibility of such 
moral objections to the use of FDA-approved teratogens that would necessitate the 
concomitant use of contraception); Robertson, supra note 177, at 17-31 (explaining 
that interests in protecting preimplantation embryos and fears of descending the 
slippery slope toward human cloning could not justify a state prohibition on the use 
of FDA-approved ESC treatments); id. at 24 (“If moral repugnance is not an 
acceptable basis for denying a person sexual intimacy or reproductive freedom, it 
should not justify denying the right to life and health on which sexual freedom and 
the exercise of other liberties depend.”). 
 184. Cf. Eryn Brown & Adolfo Flores, HIV/AIDS; A Dose of Dispute; 
Truvada Reduces the Chances of HIV, but Some in the Gay Community Call It a 
“Party Drug” That Encourages Risky Behavior, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at AA1 
(reporting that proponents of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) object that critics are 
“engaging in what they call a shaming exercise similar to the disapproval unmarried 
women faced 50 years ago when they demanded access to the birth control pill”); 
John Ritter, Ads Linked to Rise in Rate of HIV Infections: City Considers Ban on 
Drug Billboards, USA TODAY, Apr. 6, 2001, at 4A (reporting that San Francisco 
considered prohibiting any print advertisements in bus shelters of drugs for the 
treatment of AIDS because of concerns that they conveyed an overly optimistic 
message about their safety and effectiveness and might undermine efforts to 
encourage safer sex). 
 185. See Rob Stein, Cervical Cancer Vaccine Gets Injected with a Social 
Issue; Some Fear a Shot for Teens Could Encourage Sex, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 
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previously, the fact that the CDC has recommended such 
immunizations would bolster an obstacle preemption argument,186 but 
the question here asks whether individuals wishing to use this 
vaccine would enjoy any constitutional right to do so. What if a state 
such as Florida banned erectile dysfunction drugs out of concerns 
that they promoted promiscuity and the spread of STDs among aging 
Baby Boomers?187 
In Whalen v. Roe,188 the Supreme Court rejected a substantive 
due process challenge to New York legislation that had required the 
use of triplicate prescription forms (with a copy sent to state 
officials) for purposes of monitoring the use and abuse of Schedule II 
drugs.189 These recordkeeping requirements plainly exceeded those 
                                                                                                                
2005, at A3; see also Jonathan T. Scott, Note, The Difficult Road to Compelling 
Vaccination for Sexually Transmitted Diseases—How Gardasil and Those to Follow 
Will Change the Way That States Require Inoculation, 97 KY. L.J. 697, 710 (2008-
2009) (“[B]ecause many religious groups believe in celibacy before marriage, the 
issue of abstinence will likely become a decisive issue in the Gardasil debate.”); id. 
at 711 (“To many, STD vaccination may encourage the breaking of the Seventh 
Commandment and undermine the institution of marriage. Similarly, STD 
vaccination could threaten religious teachings from other religious groups 
concerning the sanctity of marriage.”). In fact, several states had considered 
mandating the use of Gardasil, which triggered an outcry from some corners. See R. 
Alta Charo, Politics, Parents, and Prophylaxis—Mandating HPV Vaccination in the 
United States, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1905, 1906 (2007); Jason L. Schwartz & 
Laurel A. Easterling, State Vaccination Requirements for HPV and Other Vaccines 
for Adolescents, 1990-2015, 314 JAMA 185, 186 (2015) (“Why HPV vaccine 
requirements have not been more widely implemented is unclear, but may reflect 
reluctance among states to revisit the contentious political climate surrounding 
requirement proposals in 2006-2007.”). 
 186. See Rob Stein, Routine HPV Vaccination Recommended for Boys, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2011, at A2 (reporting that the CDC had issued its 
recommendation for use in pre-teen girls shortly after the FDA approved the drug in 
2006). Thus, the fact that the CDC added Gardasil to its recommended vaccine 
schedule seems far more relevant for preemption purposes than the mere fact of 
FDA approval. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Barbara Marshall, Sex and the Single Senior, PALM BEACH POST 
(Fla.), Oct. 23, 2010, at 1D, 2010 WLNR 21377442; see also Diedtra Henderson, 
Sex Drugs Called Avenue to HIV, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 26, 2005, at E1 (reporting that 
the FDA had scheduled a public meeting to discuss such concerns); Sabin Russell, 
San Francisco Doctor Wants Viagra to Be Controlled Substance, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 
24, 2004, at B1 (reporting that the director for STDs at the City’s health department 
had petitioned the FDA to restrict such drugs); cf. Anupam B. Jena et al., Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases Among Users of Erectile Dysfunction Drugs: Analysis of 
Claims Data, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1, 1, 5-6 (2010) (finding that such 
concerns are overstated). 
 188. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 189. See id. at 597-604. 
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imposed by Congress, but they did not in any way appear to conflict 
with or frustrate the purposes of the federal Controlled Substances 
Act.190 Plaintiffs did not, however, make any argument under the 
Supremacy Clause, relying instead on the Fourteenth Amendment 
and claiming, among other things, that the reporting requirement 
would interfere with patients’ privacy-based rights to make 
independent decisions about the use of drugs.191 The Court held that 
the reporting mechanism imposed no serious burden on such 
choices.192 
In further explaining this decision, Justice Stevens remarked: 
“Although the State no doubt could prohibit entirely the use of 
particular Schedule II drugs, it has not done so. This case is therefore 
unlike those in which the Court held that a total prohibition of certain 
conduct was an impermissible deprivation of liberty.”193 Although 
the Court had no particular product before it, any members of the 
class of Schedule II drugs that New York might have decided to 
ban—i.e., reclassify as Schedule I—presumably would have had 
approval from the FDA (on top of its classification under the federal 
Controlled Substances Act as a Schedule II drug), putting aside the 
                                                     
 190. Cf. supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the CSA’s savings 
clause). Indeed, the federal government has encouraged all states to establish such 
prescription drug monitoring systems. See Cynthia Billhartz Gregorian, Addiction to 
Painkillers Is a Growing Problem: How to Kick It, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at 
A13 (“Forty-three states have passed legislation to do just that, although only 33 
states have money to fund them.”); see also Ashley Dutko, Note, Florida’s Fight 
Against Prescription Drug Abuse: Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 34 
NOVA L. REV. 739, 747-54 (2010); Melody Petersen & Barry Meier, Few States 
Track Prescriptions as Way to Prevent Overdoses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at A1 
(reporting that doctors and drug companies had opposed such efforts in the past). 
 191. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600. 
 192. See id. at 602-04; id. at 606 (“[T]his record does not establish an 
invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 193. Id. at 603 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 603 n.30 (“It is, of course, 
well settled that the State has broad police powers in regulating the administration of 
drugs by the health professions.”). The decisions cited by the Court as support for 
the first quoted sentence stand for the unremarkable proposition that states can 
sanction drug abusers and enjoy primary authority in regulating medical 
professionals, but they did not suggest any power to ban the use of pharmaceutical 
products in treating legitimate patients. See id. (citing Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954); and 
Minn. ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921)). Although Martinson 
arguably came closest to supporting the Whalen Court’s point, that decision long 
predated any sort of federal licensing system for drugs, and Robinson’s extended 
quotation of the relevant passage from Martinson in the same year that the FDA 
initiated its modern system for drug approval represented nothing but dicta. 
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possibility that state lawmakers sought only to make a symbolic 
gesture or acted preemptively in anticipation of FDA approval.194 In 
order to pose the question more concretely, did Whalen foreclose the 
possibility that patients in Massachusetts might have enjoyed a 
constitutional right of access to the Schedule II drug Zohydro?195 
Does the Supreme Court’s dictum go so far as to suggest that a state 
could altogether bar access to a drug without particularly good 
reason (as implied by the first sentence quoted above),196 or did the 
Court instead mean that a state might well have good reasons for 
doing so (as implied by reading the second sentence quoted above as 
a limitation on the first and in view of the fact that, by definition, 
Schedule II drugs carry a high potential for abuse)?197 Only rarely 
have courts or commentators referenced this passage from Whalen, 
much less tried to make sense of it.198 
                                                     
 194. The fact that a drug substance appears in Schedule II does not 
invariably mean that the FDA has approved a product with that active ingredient. 
After all, pure hydrocodone carried such a classification for more than forty years 
before the agency approved Zohydro. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Of 
course, the only Schedule II drugs possibly affected by the more limited state law 
upheld in Whalen must have had FDA approval because otherwise a physician 
would have been unable to prescribe them. 
 195. Judge Zobel had cited Whalen only for the basic proposition that “the 
Commonwealth’s police powers permit it to regulate the administration of drugs by 
the health professions.” Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 
3339610, at *4 (D. Mass. July 8, 2014), vacated in part, 2014 WL 4273251 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 28, 2014). 
 196. See People v. Privatera, 591 P.2d 919, 923 (Cal. 1979) (“If the state has 
the power to ban a drug with a recognized medical use because of its potential for 
abuse, then—given a rational basis for doing so—the state clearly has the power to 
ban a drug [amygdalin] not recognized [by the FDA] as effective for its intended 
use.”). Laetrile did not, however, qualify as a controlled substance much less one in 
Schedule II. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
 197. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Health Care Choice and the Constitution: 
Reconciling Privacy and Public Health, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 29-30 n.149 (1989) 
(“[T]his dictum appears to reflect a perception that the public interest behind such a 
prohibition would be strong, rather than that the right to privacy would not be 
implicated.”); see also Whalen, 429 U.S. at 592-93 (“Our concern is limited to 
Schedule II which includes the most dangerous of the legitimate drugs.”). 
 198. See, e.g., Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 841 n.7 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(“Additional factors apparently underlying the Court’s ruling were that the State 
could have proscribed use of the drugs entirely . . . .”); State v. Wiedeman, 835 
N.W.2d 698, 709 (Neb. 2013); Doe v. Axelrod, 527 N.Y.S.2d 385, 401 (App. Div. 
1988); Margaret B. Hoppin, Note, Overly Intimate Surveillance: Why Emergent 
Public Health Surveillance Programs Deserve Strict Scrutiny Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1950, 1968 & n.89 (2012); see also B. Jessie Hill, 
The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two 
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 304 (2007) (recognizing that “the Court’s 
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The freedom to make choices about medical interventions 
seems to differ constitutionally from other choices in the marketplace 
of consumer goods and services.199 Thus, the Supreme Court held 
that the State of Nebraska could not ban one of two recognized 
methods of late-term abortion without including an exception when 
necessary to protect a woman’s health,200 while only a few years later 
it decided that Congress could conclude otherwise.201 Although such 
medical procedures do not undergo any form of federal licensure,202 
this pair of decisions might help to explain what makes a state 
                                                                                                                
statements about outlawing certain drugs were pure dicta”); Note, Last Resorts and 
Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process Implications of Prohibitions on 
Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985, 1996 n.61 (2005) (suggesting why 
“this point should be treated with care”). 
 199. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603 (“Nor can it be said that any individual has 
been deprived of the right to decide independently, with the advice of his physician, 
to acquire and to use needed medication.”); Hill, supra note 198, at 305-13, 329-32, 
341-45 (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of autonomy in making choices 
about medical care); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited 
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1827 
(2007) (“[T]o impose a substantial burden on the patient’s right to protect her life 
through medical procedures, the government should have to show that it has an 
extremely powerful reason for burdening the right and that the burden is genuinely 
necessary because the government’s goals can’t be achieved in less burdensome 
ways.” (footnote omitted)). 
 200. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930-38 (2000); see also Ayotte 
v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327-28, 331 (2006) (holding 
that state restriction on minors’ access to abortion required a health exception); Hill, 
supra note 198, at 310, 319-20, 322-25 (finding a more limited recognition of this 
exception in the Court’s subsequent rejection of a challenge to the federal 
prohibition on this same abortion procedure); Volokh, supra note 199, at 1826 
(“Postviability abortions cannot be distinguished on the ground that they involve the 
woman’s reproductive choice. After viability, the time for that choice has passed, 
and the right to get a therapeutic abortion is a consequence of the woman’s medical 
self-defense right, not her abortion-as-choice right.”). Commentators invoking the 
health exception required by the Supreme Court for abortion restrictions do so in 
order to claim a substantive due process right of terminally ill patients without other 
options to access investigational drugs; surely such a constitutional claim more 
readily embraces a right of access to therapeutic products that already have received 
FDA approval. 
 201. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161-67 (2007). For a vague 
parallel in the context of pharmaceuticals, consider methaqualone, which the FDA 
had approved for the treatment of insomnia but Congress later overrode and dictated 
its placement in Schedule I. See Pub. L. No. 98-329, 98 Stat. 280 (1984); see also 
Noah, supra note 35, at 59 (“Congress concluded that methaqualone offered no 
advantages over other products that posed less of a risk of abuse.”). 
 202. See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard 
Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 447-49 
(2002). 
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prohibition on an FDA-approved pharmaceutical product 
problematic. If the agency has not approved a particular drug (or has 
withdrawn such an approval), then generally no one in the country 
can secure access to it;203 if, however, the agency has issued a license 
but one state acts to disregard it, then persons in that state (and only 
that state) cannot take advantage of a pharmaceutical product even 
though it has received official sanction. In short, upon FDA approval 
the baseline shifts from nonavailability to availability for patients, 
which a particular state’s prohibition then would unsettle in a way 
that restricted the freedom to make potentially critical medical 
choices. 
The act of federal licensure, even if not enough to trigger 
implied preemption under the Supremacy Clause, seems to make the 
state’s burden of justification nearly impossible in the event that 
some form of heightened scrutiny applies.204 Under what 
circumstances might a state have a substantial (much less a 
compelling) interest in barring access to a drug that the FDA just 
approved, and could it not typically serve any such interest by means 
more narrowly tailored than an outright prohibition on sale?205 
Massachusetts plainly disagreed with the agency’s risk-benefit 
judgment when it licensed Zohydro, but how seriously could a 
reviewing court take the contrary views of state officials in light of 
that approval,206 and did not the state—as amply revealed by the steps 
that it took after issuance of the preliminary injunctions—have more 
                                                     
 203. Similarly, once Congress banned partial birth abortion, Nebraska 
presumably could resurrect its earlier prohibition (carrying more draconian penalties 
than imposed under federal law) without running afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 204. See Sarah Ricks, The New French Abortion Pill: The Moral Property of 
Women, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 90-92, 99 (1989) (arguing that FDA approval 
would make it impossible for individual states seeking to prohibit use of the drug to 
invoke safety rationales if challenged as burdening the right to privacy). 
 205. Cf. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1977) (“A 
total prohibition against sale of contraceptives, for example, would intrude upon 
individual decisions in matters of procreation and contraception as harshly as a 
direct ban on their use. Indeed, . . . since more easily and less offensively enforced, 
[it] might have an even more devastating effect . . . .”). 
 206. If courts could freely disregard the FDA’s risk-benefit judgment, then, 
because prescription drugs invariably carry a risk of serious side effects, state 
officials wanting to ban a pharmaceutical product could simply point to the risk 
labeling approved by the agency as the basis for asserting a safety rationale for their 
action. See Shrake, supra note 180, at 488-89; id. at 492 (“Because these admittedly 
adverse health consequences [of hormonal contraceptives] are conceded, there 
would be no need for a state even to prove its case.”). 
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nuanced mechanisms of control at its disposal?207 Then again, 
Zohydro hardly qualifies as a life-saving drug, and patients in severe 
pain would still have any number of long-acting opioid analgesic 
substitutes available to them.208 
CONCLUSION 
Not surprisingly, the question posed at the outset does not 
admit of an easy answer. In certain circumstances, states may enjoy 
the authority to prohibit the sale of an FDA-approved 
pharmaceutical. The constitutional analysis—whether framed in 
terms of implied preemption, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, or 
substantive due process—may depend on answers to several 
subsidiary questions: Did the federal government actively encourage 
the introduction or use of the product; how much time has elapsed 
since the FDA licensed it (and has new information emerged that 
might alter the agency’s original risk-benefit judgment); does the 
product offer significant benefits to patients who find themselves in 
dire straits (or wish to exercise their recognized rights in making 
procreative choices); does it pose significant risks to patients or 
others (reflected, for instance, with a Schedule II designation); and 
                                                     
 207. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. When the State of 
Florida faced an epidemic of opioid abuse, it successfully tackled unscrupulous 
suppliers (so-called “pill mills”) rather than the drug products themselves. See Hal 
Johnson et al., Decline in Drug Overdose Deaths After State Policy Changes—
Florida, 2010-2012, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 569 (2014); see also 
Barry Meier & Sabrina Tavernise, States Push to Curb Painkiller Overuse, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2016, at B1 (“[T]he pace of activity in states has grown so intense 
that experts are having difficulty keeping track. Currently, there are about 375 
proposals in state legislatures that would regulate pain clinics and several aspects of 
prescribing painkillers,” and Massachusetts just enacted legislation that allows 
physicians to prescribe no more than a seven-day supply of such drugs after an 
injury or surgery.). 
 208. Cf. Noah, supra note 93, at 865 (“[A]re powerful analgesics properly 
dismissed as merely ‘lifestyle’ drugs? Contraceptives sometimes get trivialized in 
this fashion.”); id. at 866 (“In the final analysis, all drugs are, to one degree or 
another, lifestyle drugs.”). If, however, some patients could not tolerate any of the 
alternatives, see id. at 849 & n.39, 855-56 (explaining the flaws in assuming 
therapeutic substitutability), then a state prohibition would deprive them of access to 
palliative care in seeming contravention of the Court’s guidance in the physician-
assisted suicide cases, see supra note 173 and accompanying text; see also Stenberg 
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 934 (2000) (“A rarely used treatment might be necessary 
to treat a rarely occurring disease that could strike anyone—the State cannot prohibit 
a person from obtaining treatment simply by pointing out that most people do not 
need it.”). 
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does the state’s contrary judgment reflect special local conditions or 
concerns? Because pharmaceuticals run the gamut on these various 
measures, a state’s decision to deprive patients of access to a drug 
licensed by the FDA would not invariably run afoul of the 
Constitution, unless, of course, one takes seriously the Supreme 
Court’s expansive approach to implied preemption in its latest tort 
decision, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett.209 The recent 
experience with Zohydro in Massachusetts nicely posed the relevant 
questions, but the resolution of the resulting litigation unfortunately 
offered little in the way of persuasive answers. 
                                                     
 209. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); see also supra Section II.A (elaborating). 
